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Abstract 
Supplier performance evaluation (SPE) is “the process of evaluating, 
measuring, and monitoring supplier performance and suppliers’ business processes 
and practices for the purposes of reducing costs, mitigating risk, and driving 
continuous improvement” (Gordon, 2008, p. 4).  Numerous weaknesses associated 
with industrial buyers’ collection and use of SPE information (a.k.a., past 
performance information) have been documented in the for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors. These weaknesses call into question the efficacy of SPEs.  Neither the 
factors affecting SPE efficacy (i.e., its antecedents) nor the effects of SPE efficacy 
(i.e., consequences) on suppliers have been empirically explored.  Despite the 
fallibility of SPE schemes, there are no known studies that explore the accuracy of 
SPEs, nor are there studies examining whether and how inaccurate SPEs affect 
suppliers – specifically, their performance. The purpose of this research, therefore, is 
to identify the factors affecting SPE efficacy, then to examine how SPE efficacy, in 
turn, affects supplier outcomes. This research employs a mixed method of 
qualitative interviews and quantitative analysis of survey data collected from 
suppliers and from assessors of supplier performance. Based on the findings, the 
research makes several contributions to theory and practice, and provides directions 
for future research.   
Keywords:  Supplier Performance Evaluation, Past Performance, Contract 
Management, Supplier Reputation, Transaction Costs, Adverse Selection, Rating 
Justification, Rating Dissonance 
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Introduction 
Industrial buyers labor to avoid the deleterious effects of the laws of 
agency.  In industrial buying, the supplier serves as an agent to the principal (i.e., 
the buying organization).  Substantial transaction costs are dedicated to avoid 
adverse selection — the risk of selecting an incapable supplier that otherwise 
misrepresents itself as capable.  Following contract formation, more transaction 
costs are incurred to monitor supplier performance to thwart supplier 
opportunism ex post.   
Supplier performance evaluation (SPE) became popular in the 1950s 
(Wieters and Ostrom,1979), and now SPE is an essential best practice in 
business-to-business sourcing (Gordon, 2008; Talluri and Sarkis, 2002).  SPE is 
“the process of evaluating, measuring, and monitoring supplier performance and 
suppliers’ business processes and practices for the purposes of reducing costs, 
mitigating risk, and driving continuous improvement” (Gordon, 2008, p. 4).  SPEs 
are used to: (1) prioritize supplier improvement activities, (2) focus management 
attention on critical suppliers, (3) support supplier selection decisions, (4) 
communicate dissatisfaction with supplier performance, (5) communicate 
performance expectations to suppliers, (6) document historical performance, (7) 
inform the purchasing department of supply base performance, (8) influence 
suppliers, and (9) continuously improve (Schmitz and Platt, 2003). Specifically, 
SPEs inform source selection decisions of the likelihood that a prospective 
supplier will successfully perform the contract (FASA, 1994).   
Similarly, the primary purpose of the U.S. federal government’s Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) “is to ensure that current, 
complete and accurate information on contractor performance is available for use 
in procurement source selections” (Naval Sea Logistics Center Portsmouth, 
2014, p.1). The idea is that by better informing source selection decisions, better 
best value selections will occur.  Integrally related is the supplier’s level of 
performance. If performance levels are assessed and recorded, and if this 
information is available to buyers during a future source selection, it is believed 
that suppliers will work harder to ensure satisfactory (or better) performance 
(OFPP, 2000).    
 Despite long-term awareness of weaknesses and despite recent, 
concerted, high-level efforts to improve past performance reporting, the 
government’s past performance evaluations of its suppliers continue to be 
deficient (GAO, 2014). Too often, they are not properly, timely, or accurately 
completed. Reports often lack sufficient information to support ratings (e.g., how 
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the contractor exceeded or failed to meet requirements) necessary to withstand a 
legal challenge, or do not include a rating for all performance areas (OFPP, 
2011).  Additionally, throughout the rating process, raters are often inclined to 
inflate ratings in order to avoid conflict with the contractor (GAO, 2009).    
Unreliable or inaccurate past performance assessments can harm 
contractors’ reputations and can bias source selections resulting in adverse 
selection. If past performance information is not reliable, and if buyers and 
evaluators do not (or cannot) use the information to discriminate between 
competitive proposals (Kelman, 2010), the effort of collecting and reporting the 
past performance information is squandered. Likewise, the efforts of prospective 
suppliers in documenting and of buyer-side evaluators in evaluating inaccurate 
past performance information during source selections is wasted. Notably, we 
don’t know how much transaction costs by all parties involved are consumed in 
completing a past performance evaluation.  If the effort is significant, and the 
resultant information is of little value, policy-makers should revisit the policy and 
its implementing systems. Notwithstanding, buying organizations often use SPE 
information to identify and rank superior performing suppliers. Of course, the 
rankings and status are suspect if the underlying SPE ratings are not accurate.   
 Problems are not unique to the not-for-profit sector. Hald and Ellegaard 
(2011) found that supplier evaluations change throughout the evaluation process.  
Underlying data captured in enterprise resource planning (ERP) databases is 
often flawed.  Masses of performance data are condensed into more general 
ratings sacrificing fidelity. Buyers also commonly use multiple evaluators to rate 
supplier performance (Hald and Ellegaard, 2011; Buffa and Ross, 2011), which 
invites different perspectives of supplier performance. To what extent does the 
evaluators’ dissonance affect perceived accuracy of SPEs?  Additionally, the 
degree of internal dissonance of supplier evaluations has not yet been examined.  
Hald and Ellegaard (2011) also reported that performance ratings are sometimes 
negotiated with suppliers when the accuracy is challenged. However, no one has 
explored why buyers decide to change their evaluations.     
 Despite the fallibility of SPE schemes, there are no known studies that 
explore the accuracy of SPEs.  Therefore, further investigation is needed in order 
to explore the validity of SPE processes.  After all, SPE assessments can affect 
key outcomes such as contract compliance, supplier performance payments, 
supplier reputation, future business awards, incentive awards, and status 
achievement (e.g., a “preferred” supplier).  As such, the effectiveness of SPEs in 
assisting source selection decisions is questionable (Berrios, 2006).  In other 
words, we do not know the extent to which SPEs validly build the buyer’s 
confidence in its assessment of the risk of doing business with a particular 
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supplier prior to contract award.  Furthermore, the impact of deficient SPEs on 
the industrial supply base is unknown.   
Scope and Objectives  
 The purpose of this research, therefore, is to explain the efficacy of SPE 
and to explore the effects of SPE efficacy on supplier outcomes such as 
performance and relationship quality.  This research explores the extent to which 
the supplier performance information collection and usage processes achieve the 
intended goals of: (1) mitigating the risk of adverse selection, and (2) motivating 
supplier performance.  The following research questions are explored:   
1. What factors decrease the efficacy of SPEs? 
2. How do suppliers react to inaccurate SPEs?  
3. Do SPEs, in general, motivate suppliers to increase performance? 
4. How does the accuracy of SPEs affect relationship quality?  
5. Why are SPEs often inaccurate?   
6. How many man-hours do suppliers invest in responding to SPEs? 
7. What communication tactics do suppliers use to manage the SPE 
process?  
8. To what extent does inter-rater disagreement (i.e., dissonance) affect 
SPE efficacy?   
The answers to these eight questions should help identify the antecedents 
and consequences of SPE. The remainder of this paper is organized in the 
following manner.  The research explores antecedents and consequences to 
SPE efficacy, and uses two separate approaches to do so. To explore the 
antecedents, this research builds off of prior research (Hawkins, 2013) to test 
previously-suggested propositions of buyer-side factors that affect SPE efficacy.  
To identify the consequences of SPE efficacy on suppliers, an exploratory, 
qualitative approach is employed. Likewise, the research is organized in this split 
manner. The first part of the methodology and results section addresses the 
antecedents in a quantitative, hypothesis testing, confirmatory approach. In 
contrast, the second part is exploratory, seeking to identify outcomes of SPE 
efficacy on suppliers. First, a literature review is presented describing the 
conceptual framework and hypotheses. Next, the study presents the research 
designs and methodologies. Lastly, discussion, limitations, implications, future 
research directions, and conclusions are offered.  
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Literature Review 
Similar to the conclusion of Ashworth et al. (2002), a single 
comprehensive theoretical framework explaining the efficacy of collecting and 
using supplier past performance information was not found. Such a complex 
phenomenon can only be explained by synthesizing multiple theories such as 
those found in the management, marketing channels, supply chain management, 
and organizational behavior domains. Specific, relevant theories include agency 
theory, organizational behavior, channel communication, and social exchange 
theory. Before discussing each theory, the foundation is set by discussing the 
government’s past performance policies and SPEs in general.    
Past Performance 
U.S. federal government contracting serves as the context for this study 
due to its expansive scope (dollars, industries, and geographies), rigor, 
established fairness, and standardized procedures. In U.S. federal government 
contracting, agencies are required to consider past performance information as 
an evaluation factor in source selections exceeding the simplified acquisition 
threshold, $150,000 (FAR Part 15)—unless the contracting officer documents a 
reason not to do so. By necessity, then, agencies must collect and report 
contractor past performance information from government contracts (FAR Part 
42) surpassing certain dollar values (weapon systems, $5 million; operations 
support, $5 million; services, $1 million; information technology, $1 million; 
healthcare, $100,000; fuels, $100,000; construction, $650,000; and 
architect/engineering services, $30,000). The FAR defines past performance 
information as:  
relevant information, for future source selection purposes, 
regarding a contractor’s actions under previously-awarded 
contracts. It includes, for example, the contractor’s record of 
conforming to contract requirements and to standards of good 
workmanship; the contractor’s record of forecasting and controlling 
costs; the contractor’s adherence to contract schedules, including 
the administrative aspects of performance; the contractor’s history 
of reasonable and cooperative behavior and commitment to 
customer satisfaction; the contractor’s reporting into databases; the 
contractor’s record of integrity and business ethics, and generally, 
the contractor’s business-like concern for the interest of the 
customer. (FAR Part 42.1501) 
It is important to note that in keeping with the government’s core goal of 
transparency and fairness (FAR 1.102), contractors must be afforded the 
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opportunity to comment on the government’s assessment of past performance, 
and any disagreements must be resolved by a reviewing official one level above 
the contracting officer. Additionally, contractor past performance assessments 
are increasingly subject to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (Lord, 2005). While 
the courts will not yet direct a particular rating, they will require agencies to 
adequately support assessments/ratings with sufficient facts. This written 
justification consumes significant time from the raters, contractors (i.e., rebuttals), 
and approving officials—as does adjudicating a claim should an 
assessment/rating be disputed. As further incentive to conceal true performance, 
program officials will go to extraordinary lengths to protect their programs. A 
poorly performing contractor can signal a troubled program, increasing the threat 
of cancelation (GAO, 2009). Other reasons that truthful performance is not 
reported include a desire to maintain relations with the contractor, difficulty 
attributing performance problems to the contractor or to the government, deficient 
oversight of contractors, deficient contract administration, and the government’s 
lack of contractor performance management (GAO, 2009). 
It is also important to note the U.S. Military Departments’ recently-
emerged practice of ranking government contractors based on performance 
across multiple contracts. This annual ranking, deemed the superior supplier 
incentive program (SSIP), relies on performance data from CPARs (USD AT&L, 
2015). The purpose is to incentivize contractor performance, and to recognize 
those top achievers. The SSIP ranks the top 30 suppliers defined by the highest 
3-year dollar obligations, and ranks the suppliers’ business uni ts at the business 
unit level. Suppliers deemed a superior supplier, are eligible for relaxed or more 
favorable contract terms and conditions (e.g., progress payment retention 
percentage, increased intervals between business system reviews, priority for 
adjudicating final labor and indirect cost rates, etc.). Hence, the efficacy of the 
SPE process takes on additional meaning by providing firms bragging rights (i.e., 
marketing material and enhanced reputation) and eased admininstrative 
burdens.  
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Supplier Performance Evaluation 
Supplier performance management (SPM) is “the process of evaluating, 
measuring, and monitoring supplier performance and suppliers’ business 
processes and practices for the purposes of reducing costs, mitigating risk, and 
driving continuous improvement” (Gordon, 2008, p. 4).  SPM systems are used to 
(1) prioritize supplier improvement activities, (2) focus management attention on 
critical suppliers, (3) support supplier selection decisions, (4) communicate 
dissatisfaction with supplier performance, (5) communicate performance 
expectations to suppliers, (6) document historical performance, (7) inform the 
purchasing department of supply base performance, (8) influence suppliers, and 
(9) continuously improve (Schmitz & Platts, 2003).  “Performance based systems 
maximize the use of data, which is then used to convey specific improvement 
targets, set goals, monitor performance, and evaluate that performance” 
(Giunipero & Brewer, 1993, p. 39).   
It is not surprising that buying firms closely measure their suppliers’ 
performance when 50%–70% of their revenue is spent on goods and services to 
support the sales (Monczka et al., 2011b).  Measuring supplier quality is critical 
since the cost of poor quality ranges from 10% to 25% of sales, and the cost of 
poor supplier quality ranges from 25% to 70% of the cost of poor quality (Gordon, 
2008).  Commercial SPM systems—often web-based and at least partially 
automated—encompass means to measure, rate, and rank suppliers.  In 2002, 
more than half (54%) of for-profit sector buyers did this continuously (Simpson et 
al., 2002), and two-thirds of buyers ranked their suppliers based on performance.  
A more recent study reported a drastic increase in supplier performance 
measurement and ranking, showing that 97% of firms use a periodic supplier 
scorecard or assessment for direct materials (CAPS Research, 2011).     
SPM pays off; a study by the Aberdeen Group (2005) found that supplier 
performance of companies with an SPM system improved significantly more than 
did the supplier performance of firms with no SPM system. Specifically, firms 
using an SPM system realized 10% greater price savings, 12% better on-time 
delivery improvement, four times greater quality improvement, and a 4% greater 
improvement in service. One large telecommunications firm realized a 65.5 % 
reduction in the number of suppliers and a 61.5% reduction in the value of 
inventory held due to an SPM system (Cormican & Cunningham, 2007). Another 
study (Limberakis, 2011) found that “best-in-class” buyers (1) are much more 
likely to benchmark supplier performance against others in the same industry, (2) 
achieved substantially higher percent on-time delivery (88% versus 48% for 
“laggards”), and (3) transacted with suppliers that experienced fewer catastrophic 
failure (2% versus 5% for other buyers). Of the best-in-class buyers, 63% had a 
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supplier benchmarking and performance monitoring information technology 
system in place. Additionally, the use of a performance evaluation program 
increases the strength of the relationship between suppliers’ process 
innovativeness and the buyer’s performance benefits (Azadegan, 2011). The use 
of an SPM system was also found to improve buyer–supplier relationships 
(Prahinski & Benton, 2004). Prahinski and Fan (2007) found that the frequency 
and content of feedback increase the suppliers’ commitment to the buyer, which, 
in turn, increases supplier performance. Denali Consulting group found that SPM 
can yield a 3% to 6% cost reduction in total supply chain costs via continuous 
improvements (Minahan, 2007). A study by CAPS Research (Monczka et al., 
2011a) of eight firms found that supplier performance measurement is one of five 
critical components of effective supplier relationship management (SRM), and 
that SRM enables vast positive results such as the following: overhead cost 
reductions, process improvements, increased visibility into actual costs (versus 
price), year-over-year cost reductions, millions of dollars in savings, product 
launches on time and on cost, shorter new product development times, total cost 
reductions of 12%, and quality improvements. As such, all leading purchasing 
textbooks devote a section to SPM (Benton, 2010; Burt et al., 2003; Leenders et 
al., 2006; Monczka et al., 2011; Rudzki et al., 2006; Trent, 2007). Not 
surprisingly, SPM is a core competence of chief procurement officers (Kern et al., 
2011). 
Most SPM processes used by buyers integrate subjective and objective 
evaluations (Simpson et al., 2002; Hald & Ellegaard, 2011). It is assumed that 
these assessments are accurate; however, as Gordon (2008) pointed out, even 
the seemingly most-objective performance parameters, such as percent on-time 
delivery, can be subjective. The supplier evaluation process has rarely been 
examined, and social and organizational biases have been ignored (Purdy & 
Safayeni, 2000).  Hald and Ellegaard (2011) found that supplier evaluations are 
shaped and reshaped throughout the evaluation process. They discovered 
performance data instability as captured in enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
databases. They also found that evaluations were derived by condensing a larger 
set of performance information to a smaller, more manageable set of numbers. 
Buyers also commonly use multiple evaluators to rate supplier performance 
(Buffa & Ross, 2011; Hald & Ellegaard, 2011). Buffa and Ross (2011) noted the 
importance of supplier evaluation by functionally heterogeneous evaluation 
teams.  Subjective measures among multiple raters invite dissonance in ratings 
and opinions—either on the same performance observations or across different 
instances of performance (Buffa & Ross, 2011). Similarly, Perkins (1993) noted 
that the different members of the buying organization’s procurement team 
perceive the supplier’s value delivery differently.  While Buffa and Ross (2011) 
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offered an ex post means to accommodate variance among multiple evaluators, 
there remains little explanation as to systemic sources of the variance.  Hence, 
are there factors that can be managed to mitigate performance evaluators’ 
dissonance?  Additionally, the degree of internal dissonance of supplier 
evaluations has not yet been examined.  Hald and Ellegaard (2011) also reported 
that performance ratings are sometimes negotiated with suppliers when the 
accuracy is challenged.  However, no one has explored why buyers decide to 
change their evaluations.  Additionally, evaluations are only as good as the data 
recorded by surveillance; yet, instances of surveillance may not reveal true 
performance levels (Purdy & Safayeni, 2000). 
Given the above findings, the focal outcome of interest of this study is 
SPE Efficacy – defined herein as the extent to which SPEs achieve the two 
stated goals of motivating supplier performance and, during source selection, 
mitigating the risk of unsuccessful performance (i.e., avoid adverse selection).  
The ensuing review of the relevant literature identifies the central factors affecting 
SPE efficacy, then peels the onion back further to unveil their antecedents. 
Agency Theory 
This research acknowledges multiple perspectives of agency theory as it 
applies to industrial exchange.  The first perspective views the hired supplier as 
an agent to the buyer to achieve the buyer’s objectives.  The second perspective 
examines the buyer internally acknowledging that the buyer is comprised of 
multiple agents to itself. For instance, employees working in procurement, 
logistics, financial management, engineering, end users of suppliers’ goods and 
services, and program management represent distinct interests within the firm.  
Agency theory wrestles with two problems: (1) conflicting interests between 
principal and agent and (2) difficulty and cost associated with monitoring agents, 
and the associated uncertainty for not having perfect information (Eisenhardt, 
1989).   
Beginning with the second perspective, using multiple raters within an 
organization to evaluate supplier performance can create conflicts of agency. In 
the case of past performance evaluations, evaluators of performance serve as 
agents to multiple principals—their employing organization, their local 
organization or unit, and external stakeholders (e.g., shareholders or taxpayers in 
the public sector). Problems of agency arise when agents’ self-interests differ 
from his or her employer’s goals (Bergen et al., 1992). Two theories of not-for-
profit organizations support self-interested pursuits of agents. Budget-
maximization theory (Niskanen, 1968) follows the utility maximization model of 
rational human behavior to posit that bureaucrats unable to seek greater 
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compensation will instead be motivated to increase their budgets in order to 
increase their power. In contrast, the bureau-shaping model relies less on the 
assumption of utility maximization to posit that public managers develop a sense 
of ownership of their agencies and shape them to satisfy personal utilities 
(Barberis, 1998). Rather than simply enlarging the organization or accumulating 
power, bureau-shaping predicts other managerially desired outcomes such as 
reducing personal risk and increasing access to centers of power in ways that do 
not unduly increase the scope of the problems under their responsibility.  Both 
models agree that self-interest motivates public managers to accumulate power 
for personal gain.  These self-interests can conflict with that of employers, thus, 
creating problems of agency. For example, evaluators often fail to properly 
monitor a supplier’s performance.  If the supplier’s performance did not meet 
requirements, rather than rate the supplier as unsatisfactory, the evaluator might 
inflate the rating to avoid a dispute—conflict that would unveil the evaluator’s 
negligence.  Agency theory holds that once the principal delegates tasks to 
agents, there is an asymmetry in information and knowledge such that agents 
can shirk duties, distort information, and behave opportunistically. To combat 
these moral hazards, principals can increase monitoring of agents. A less costly 
approach to control agent opportunism is to align the goals of the agent to that of 
the principal, particularly using outcome-based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989).Ex 
ante, principals can screen potential agents to mitigate adverse selection.   
Problems may also emerge when agents must serve conflicting goals of 
multiple principals—also known as the “hydra factor” (Shapiro, 2005). In this 
case, the strategy of aligning agents’ interests with organizational goals is 
confounded by conflicting goals—perhaps impossibly so. This agency problem 
might manifest itself in weapon system acquisition when, for instance, a program 
plagued by technical difficulty is jeopardized if behind schedule or over budget 
(threat to taxpayers’ interest). Such a program could compromise the ability to 
deliver a system that meets end user needs (threat to end user).  Additionally, 
jobs that are dependent on this program could be jeopardized (threat to program 
executive officer’s and Congress’ interest). In this case, an evaluator could be 
biased toward a favorable SPE in order to protect the supplier and the program 
from scrutiny.  This is an area ripe for further research (Shapiro, 2005). 
In agency theory, large organizations of many people and sub-
organizations are assumed to act as one homogeneous entity. This is criticized 
as “misplaced methodological individualism” (Worsham et al., 1997, p. 423). In 
addition to multiple principals to serve, there may be multiple evaluators 
(Shapiro, 2005)—particularly on large, complex contracts and where 
performance occurs in more than one location. In cases of inter-rater 
disagreement, how is the principle’s rating of a supplier (agent) derived? Given 
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these problems of agency, rating dissonance is among the central constructs of 
this study. The variance in ratings due to multiple evaluators of supplier 
performance is referred to herein as rating dissonance. 
Organizational Behavior 
Contract performance often is a complex phenomenon to assess.  It can 
involve many supplier personnel, many buyer evaluators (Wieters & Ostrom, 
1979; Palmatier, 2008), multiple internal stakeholders and organizations, and 
multiple performance criteria at many physical locations.  Often, the stakes are 
high such as implications to profit and future business.   
Findings from organizational behavior literature are germane.  Academic 
literature on multiple-rater performance appraisal systems (e.g., 360-degree 
evaluations in which superiors, subordinates, and peers evaluate the ratee) has 
examined the underlying premise that more raters offer more unique, valuable 
information about the employee’s performance that would otherwise be lost if 
relying upon a single rater (van der Heijden & Nijhof, 2004).  Additionally, more 
raters mitigate evaluation bias (Levy et al., 1998).  While relying upon multiple 
ratings is thought to offer more fairness to ratees, variance in ratings is 
introduced attributable to individual differences in raters (Mount et al., 1998).  
Thus, different raters often conclude different ratings (Dowst, 1972; Levy et al., 
1998), which may be attributed to different backgrounds, observing different 
instances of supplier performance, and different interpretations of the meaning of 
performance critieria and rating definitions.  These differences take time and 
effort to resolve and internally agree upon a single rating or narrative. 
Multiple raters may be indicators of complexity (e.g., multiple points of 
failure and multiple locations).  Suppliers may be able to more successfully rebut 
ratings under high complexity.  Suppliers may also be more able to offset 
relatively minor failures with their successes, garnering an overall rating that is 
acceptable to the supplier.  If a supplier can “escape” unscathed in the rating 
(i.e., no threat), there is little need to increase performance, and little threat of 
negative performance information being discovered during a future source 
selection.  Given the potential for unreconciled dissonance, it is posited that: 
H1: There will be a negative relationship between rating dissonance 
and SPE efficacy.  
H2:  Rating dissonance will be positively related to the number of 
hours to complete the SPE. 
H3:  The lower the accuracy, the greater the number of hours to 
complete the SPE. 
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 In federal government contracting, suppliers are provided the SPE ratings 
and given an opportunity to respond, rebut, agree and otherwise comment.  
Disagreements are elevated to a reviewing official at least a level above the 
assessing official for resolution.  Resolution takes effort expended to explain 
original positions internally and to seek the facts substantiating the ratings.  Thus, 
supplier disputes, while allowed, are not necessarily welcomed.  This 
phenomenon is not unique to government contracting; suppliers to for-profit 
businesses may have executive-level relationships within the buying organization 
and may use those communication channels to voice disagreement with SPEs.  
Herein, this phenomenon is defined as fear of a supplier dispute.  Attempts 
among multiple raters to thwart a supplier rebuttal may invite internal conflict.  
Some evaluators may be inclined to inflate ratings to avoid a dispute, while 
others may take a legalistic, strict approach.  If inflated, accuracy suffers.  Given 
the above logic, it is hypothesized that: 
H4:  The lower the perceived accuracy, the greater the fear of 
supplier dispute. 
H5:  There will be a positive relationship between fear of supplier 
dispute and rating dissonance.   
Performance ratings are also constrained by information flow between a rater 
and ratee.  
Informational constraints implies that some self/supervisor 
discrepancies result from differing cognitions about job 
requirements. When performing any job, an employee must 
consider what tasks are to be done, how these tasks are to be 
performed, and what standards are to be used in judging the final 
outcome. Ideally, these determinations are arrived at in close 
consultation with the individual’s supervisor, thus ensuring identical 
cognitions about job requirements. In reality, such complete 
agreement is rarely achieved. The extensive literature on role 
ambiguity (e.g., House & Rizzo, 1972; Jackson & Schuler, 1985; 
Rizzo et al., 1970) provides strong evidence that employees often 
do not have a clear idea of what their supervisors expect (Campbell 
& Lee, 1988, p. 304).   
These findings are particularly relevant in service contracts where 
requirements are often not well defined (van der Valk & Rozemeijer, 2009).  
Different expectations among different performance evaluators of contractor 
requirements can affect performance evaluations.   
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Informational constraints can also stem from a supervisor’s 
misunderstanding of the employee’s job (Mitchell, 1983). Managers who are 
recruited from outside the company may have incomplete or inaccurate beliefs 
about a subordinate’s job. Similarly, in situations in which jobs are highly 
interconnected and interdependent, a supervisor either may be unable to clearly 
separate the boundaries and duties of different jobs or may do so incorrectly 
(Kiggundu, 1981).  A supervisor’s misunderstanding of a subordinate’s job also 
may reflect lack of observation (e.g., Mitchell, 1983). This has implications for a 
proper amount and method of monitoring suppliers.  Insufficient observation can 
be attributed to the number of other responsibilities a manager has to the 
inherent nature of one’s job. “Thus, it is not surprising that employees and 
supervisors may come to different conclusions about the employee’s 
effectiveness.  If initial cognitions about job responsibilities and standards differ, 
lack of agreement in ratings is inevitable” (Campbell & Lee, 1988, p. 305). Given 
that in contracting for services, requirements are often ill defined and given the 
high level of turnover in buyer-side contract administration (Hawkins et al., 2011), 
dissonance in supplier performance ratings should be commonplace. Buffa and 
Ross (2011) identified evaluator turnover as having a potential impact on supplier 
evaluations over time. Therefore, is it posited that: 
H6: There will be a negative relationship between the sufficiency of 
the requirement definition and rating dissonance.   
H7: There will be a positive relationship between the sufficiency of 
the requirement definition and perceived accuracy. 
H8: There will be a negative relationship between evaluator turnover 
and perceived accuracy. 
Affective constraints also limit the amount of agreement between a 
supervisor’s rating and ratees’ self-evaluation. “If the appraisal process triggers 
such defense mechanisms, the end result may be described as a self-serving 
bias. In this context, self-serving bias refers to the tendency of individuals to take 
personal responsibility for successful performance, but to assign responsibility for 
failure to external causes” (Campbell & Lee, 1988, p. 306). In an organizational 
buying context, failures of a capital procurement program could be unreasonably 
attributed to a supplier’s performance.    
Sometimes the employee or the supervisor knowingly gives an inaccurate 
appraisal. A supervisor may do so to preserve the effectiveness of an 
interdependent work group (Campbell & Lee, 1988).  Academic literature 
confirms a halo effect in employee performance appraisals (Thomas & Bretz, 
1994). The same concern has specifically been raised regarding SPEs (Kelman, 
2010). A halo effect could partially explain inflated (i.e., inaccurate) SPEs.  
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Deliberate dishonesty is more likely to occur in self appraisals when they are 
used for scarce resource allocation decisions (Shrauger & Osberg, 1981). In a 
supplier relationship context, supplier evaluations may also be tainted by a 
supplier seeking to preserve its reputation. Suppliers may refute any negative 
information being recorded regardless of its accuracy. To do so, they often 
challenge the rating and/or justification, which causes more effort by the buying 
organization to resolve disagreements. If buying organizations either can’t muster 
the evidence to justify a particular rating and/or consciously decide not to bother 
with the trouble to debate the rating, accuracy can suffer. Thus, it is hypothesized 
that: 
H9:  There will be a negative relationship between perceived 
 accuracy and rating dissonance. 
H10:  There will be a positive relationship between perceived 
 accuracy and SPE efficacy. 
The acceptance of feedback affects employees’ responses to feedback 
(Ilgen et al., 1979). “Specifically, acceptance refers to the recipient’s belief that 
the feedback is an accurate portrayal of his or her performance” (Ilgen et al., 
1979, p. 356). This relationship was confirmed by Kinicki et al. (2004). “Previous 
conceptual  and empirical feedback studies were based on the assumption that 
the specificity, frequency, and sign [positive] of feedback were independently 
related to the perceived accuracy of feedback” (Kinicki et al., 2004, p. 1059).     
Channel Communication 
In channel communication theory, Mohr and Sohi (1995) introduced 
“distortion.” Formality decreases communication distortion. Examining the 
government’s past performance reporting system (CPARS), the reporting is quite 
rigid and formal. However, the collaboration between multiple raters occurs 
outside of the CPAR system (i.e., not formal and highly variable). In examining 
channel communication, often three aspects of communication are explored – 
formality, bi-directionality, and frequency. If these three facets of communication 
among exchange members increases, more information is shared, better 
understandings are attained, and therefore, the accuracy of SPEs should 
increase. Therefore, it is posited that: 
H11:  There will be a positive relationship between communication 
 frequency and perceived accuracy. 
H12:  There will be a positive relationship between communication 
 bi-directionality and perceived accuracy. 
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H13:  There will be a positive relationship between communication 
 formality and perceived accuracy. 
Weaknesses in evaluators’ communications could be linked to resource 
constraints. Government acquisition personnel are often overworked and 
understaffed. Combined, this phenomenon is referred to as role overload.  
Evaluators may simply not have sufficient time to gather the requisite facts and 
write thorough, sufficient justifications for SPE assessments and ratings.  
Likewise, evaluators may not have time to reconcile rating dissonance among 
multiple evaluators. Therefore, it is posited that: 
H14:  There is a negative relationship between role overload and 
 rating justification. 
H15:  There is a positive relationship between role overload and 
 rating dissonance. 
 Critics contend that SPEs are often not accurate, and therefore the SPE 
system (e.g., CPARS) is not useful. If not factual and detailed, the SPEs cannot 
motivate suppliers to work harder and cannot provide insights that reduce the risk 
of adverse selection in the future. Hence, absent accuracy, SPEs become less 
useful. Further, if the SPE scheme is not useful, evaluators will not put forth the 
effort required to develop a detailed, factual rating justification that will be 
accepted by the supplier and, if rebutted, internally by the reviewing official.,  
Thus, it is posited that:   
H16:  There is a positive relationship between perceived usefulness  
 and rating justification. 
H17:  There is a positive relationship between perceived accuracy 
 and rating justification.  
H18:  There will be a positive relationship between rating   
 justification and SPE efficacy. 
H19:   There will be a positive relationship between perceived 
 accuracy and perceived usefulness. 
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Social Exchange Theory 
Social exchange theory (SET) serves a prominent role in explaining 
exchange.  SET is commonly used as a foundation for relationship marketing and 
buyer–seller relationships (e.g., Dwyer et al., 1987; Kingshott, 2006; Luo, 2002; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wilson, 1995). The foundational premises of SET may be 
summarized as follows. Exchange may involve both social and economic 
outcomes. These outcomes are compared to other exchange alternatives.  
Positive outcomes increase trust and commitment and, over time, norms develop 
that govern the relationship (Lambe, Wittmann, & Spekman 2001). Thus, SET 
rejects the assumption of universal opportunism and suggests that there is an 
alternate form of governance—the relationship. Parties to relational exchange, 
therefore, tend to rely more on trust, commitment, cooperation, satisfaction, and 
relational norms than strictly on written contracts (Heide & John, 1992). Contracts 
are incomplete, and can be costly and inefficient to administer as their details 
increase. Relational exchange renders the exchange more efficient.   
Relational aspects have also been found to play a mediating role between 
suppliers’ operational performance measures and a buyer’s business 
performance. Hence, measuring performance alone does not affect business 
performance. Rather, measuring supplier performance increases socialization 
mechanisms, which, in turn, increase business performance (Cousins, Lawson, & 
Squire, 2008). Socialization mechanisms are structures and processes that 
facilitate contact between the buyers and suppliers, such as cross-functional 
teams, joint sessions, routine supplier conferences, and matrix reporting 
structures. These interactions enable each party to acquire knowledge of the 
others’ social values and behavioral norms. Interactions entail communications.  
Communication increases trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), a central construct to 
effective relational exchange.   
Research that developed a taxonomy of buyer–supplier relationship types 
(Cannon & Perreault, 1999) associated higher supplier performance evaluations 
to more collaborative types of relationships. Such relationships are characterized 
by greater operational linkages, information exchanges, cooperative norms, and 
buyer and supplier adaptations to each other (i.e., unique investment and 
customizations to processes and products for the other party’s benefit). With 
greater channel cooperation, both intra-firm and extra-firm, it is posited that:  
H20:  There will be a negative relationship between relationship 
 quality and fear of a supplier dispute. 
H21:   Communication frequency will be positively related to 
 relationship quality. 
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H22:   Communication bi-directionality will be positively related to 
 relationship quality. 
H23:   There will be a positive relationship between communication 
 formality and relationship quality. 
H24:   Turnover will be negatively related to relationship quality. 
Returning to agency theory, much is said in the management, marketing, 
and supply chain literatures about supplier monitoring. Since increasing 
information via monitoring reduces uncertainty and helps prevent agent 
opportunism, monitoring (i.e., supplier surveillance) plays an important role in 
exchange relationships. As it pertains to SPEs, surveillance is used to collect 
facts of supplier performance such as quality levels delivered, on-time 
performance, and generally meeting contractual requirements. These facts may 
be used to determine performance ratings. Therefore, it is posited that: 
H25:  There will be a positive relationship between surveillance and 
 perceived accuracy. 
One relational norm important to effective exchange is fairness (Kumar et 
al., 1995). Often the concept is referred to as distributive justice, referring to the 
extent to which each exchange member’s cost-benefit ratios are approximately 
equal.  Government buyers in particular have a duty to treat suppliers fairly. In 
the for-profit sector, fair treatment of suppliers is paramount to effective 
relationship quality (Kumar et al., 1995). In an SPE context, fairness pertains to 
the extent to which the supplier is given the performance ratings it deserves (i.e., 
that which it earned). Fair ratings are those that have been earned, no more and 
no less. Particularly in cases in which requirements are not well defined, the 
criteria for evaluating supplier performance are not well defined, and/or the 
ratings used to assess performance are not well defined (or invite wide latitude in 
interpretation), a supplier must rely on the buyer to be fair. A deviation from a fair 
rating would insinuate a rating that is not right – or less than accurate.   
H26:  There will be a positive relationship between fairness and 
 perceived accuracy.   
Power/Dependence 
Power is among the most significant phenomena in buyer–supplier 
relationships.  It is defined as the ability to cause someone to do something that 
he or she would not have done otherwise (Gaski, 1984). Power and dependence 
are two sides of the same coin (John, 1984). In government contracting, 
extremely high switching costs create dependence of buyers on suppliers after 
the award of a contract. Additionally, sole source contracts are commonplace 
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which gives rise to buyer dependence (and supplier power). In such cases, 
particularly when the buyer is less than diligent in its contract administration 
duties and oversight, buyers may be tempted to use SPEs as leverage to reap 
concessions from suppliers. In cases where ratings are subtly bargained for 
some concession, the accuracy of SPEs could be questioned. Therefore, it is 
posited that: 
H27:  Leverage attitude will be negatively related to perceived 
 accuracy.  
Combined, this set of propositions should explain SPE efficacy. The 
conceptual mode (Figure 1) is sufficiently comprehensive to enable practitioners 
to determine needed definitive action to improve the effectiveness of their use of 
SPEs.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy                                                                                                          - 19 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 1.  Conceptual Model 
Note: Ovals represent latent constructs; rectangle represents objective measure 
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Methodology 
The purpose of this research is to explain the efficacy of SPE and to 
explore the effects of SPE efficacy on supplier outcomes such as performance 
and relationship quality. This research explores the extent to which the supplier 
performance information collection and usage processes achieve the intended 
goals of: (1) mitigating the risk of adverse selection, and (2) motivating supplier 
performance. Table 1 lists the eight research questions that were explored, and 
indicates the research method and object for each. This research employed 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies to examine the antecedents and 
consequences of supplier performance evaluation efficacy. First, the quantitative 
methodology and results are detailed, and then the qualitative procedures and 
results are described.   
Table 1.  Research Questions  
No. 
Research Question 
*Research 
Object 
**Research 
Method 
1 What factors decrease the efficacy of SPEs? B & S Qt & Ql 
2 How do suppliers react to inaccurate SPEs? S Ql 
3 
Do SPEs, in general, motivate suppliers to 
increase performance? 
S Ql 
4 
How does the accuracy of SPEs affect relationship 
quality?  
B & S Qt & Ql 
5 Why are SPEs often inaccurate? B & S Qt & Ql 
6 
How many man-hours do suppliers invest in 
responding to SPEs? 
S Ql 
7 
What communication tactics do suppliers use to 
manage the SPE process? 
S Ql 
8 
To what extent does inter-rater disagreement (i.e., 
dissonance) affect SPE efficacy? 
B Qt 
*B=buyer; S=supplier 
**Qt=Quantitative; Ql=Qualitative 
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Quantitative Data Analysis 
 This research examines the antecedents and consequences of supplier 
performance evaluation. Thus, the most appropriate unit of analysis was the 
transaction (i.e., the contract or delivery/task order). The most appropriate 
individual to provide data on contractor performance, the respective contract, and 
the situation was the CPARS Assessing Official.  In order to mitigate self-
selection response bias, respondents were asked to complete the survey with 
respect to their most recently completed CPAR.   
Measurement 
 The model included objective variables and latent constructs. Existing 
scales with established reliability and validity were used to measure latent 
constructs. For new constructs with no existing scales, measures were created 
from interviews with assessing officials. The following latent constructs were 
measured with newly created scales:  past performance efficacy, past 
performance rating dissonance, rating justification, leverage attitude, and fear of 
supplier dispute. These scales were developed from in-depth interviews with 
eight performance-assessing officials. For details of the interview methodology 
and informant demographics, see Hawkins (2013).   
 Surveillance was measured using a four-item scale from Stump and Heide 
(1996). Communication formality was measured using a five-item scale from 
Prahinski and Benton (2004). The role overload construct was measured with 
four items from House and Rizzo (1972). Perceived usefulness was measured 
with a six-item scale adapted from Davis (1989). Relationship quality assessed 
satisfaction, trust, and commitment as developed by Palmatier (2008).  
Commitment was measured using a four-item scale developed by Kumar et al., 
(1995). Trust was measured with a six-item scale from Johnson et al., (2004).  
Satisfaction was measured using a five-item scale from Cannon and Perault 
(1999).  A five-item scale adapted from Netemeyer and Boles (1997) was used to 
assess buyer fairness. Accuracy was measured using a ten-item scale that 
expounded on a scale developed by Kinicki et al., (2004). Sufficiency of 
requirement definition was measured using a four-item scale developed by 
Hawkins et al., (2011). Communication bi-directionality was measured using a 
two-item formative scale from Mohr and Sohi (1995). Communication frequency 
was measured using an average of the counts of the number of communications 
using various media. This average count was modeled as a formative variable 
per Mohr and Sohi (1995).     
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Pretest 
 In order to ensure that the constructs were valid in content and the survey 
items sufficiently clear, the survey instrument was reviewed by several 
academicians and contracting practitioners. Academicians included those from 
the School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.           
These experts from industry and academia were asked to review the 
survey instrument.  As recommended by Dillman (2000), feedback was solicited 
regarding whether the survey items: (1) captured the domain of the construct 
(content validity), (2) were unambiguous, (3) were simple to understand, and (4) 
were consistently interpretable. The experts were asked whether the model was 
sufficiently comprehensive, that is, whether it included all of the relevant 
constructs. The survey was modified to reflect improvements recommended by 
the experts. 
Pilot Test 
In an effort to ensure construct reliability and validity, the survey 
instrument was pilot tested using a sample of assessing officials from defense 
organizations. The population included 265 assessing officials, from which 75 
responded.  However, 34 responses were incomplete yielding 41 usable 
responses and a response rate of 15.5%. Data from the pilot test was used to 
assess construct reliability and validity prior to full-scale survey deployment 
(Churchill, 1979).     
Reliability & Validity 
 Internal consistency reliability for each latent construct was assessed 
using Cronbach’s alpha. All constructs showed adequate reliabilities greater than 
0.7 for established scales and greater than 0.6 for new scales (Hair et al., 2010).  
Since the sample was less than 50, exploratory factor analysis could not be used 
to assess construct validity. Face validity from the pretest was deemed sufficient. 
An online survey was used to collect the data. Web-based surveys yield 
slightly higher response rates than do mail surveys, and the data exhibits no 
characteristic differences than that of mail surveys (Griffis et al., 2003). The 
survey included approximately 145 questions (items) that measured each 
construct and variable in the model, including demographics collected in order to 
facilitate an assessment of generalizability.  An email invitation was sent to 
respondents informing them of the purpose and importance of the research. This 
invitation included an embedded link to the internet universal resource locator 
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(URL) to facilitate convenient access to the survey. One follow-up message 
served as a reminder to prospective respondents.      
In order to maximize the response rate, survey deployment and data 
collection utilized Dillman’s (2000) “Tailored Design Method” for internet surveys.  
Dillman’s method entails establishing trust with the respondent, increasing the 
rewards for completing the survey, and mitigating the costs of completing the 
survey. To establish trust in the current design, sponsorship by a legitimate 
authority (Dillman, 2000) was obtained as required by military department policy.  
The invitation identified that the research is for the purpose of grant-sponsored 
research, and that WKU’s Institutional Review Board would maintain oversight of 
the research.     
In order to provide rewards, the researcher showed positive regard to the 
respondent (Dillman, 2000). In the email invitation, respondents were referred to 
as valued experts whose input is critical to the research. Additionally, the 
invitation showed a support of group values (Dillman, 2000). The researcher was 
identified as a cohort in federal contracting. The respondents were offered a 
report of the results of the research. Finally, respondents were offered an 
opportunity to be entered into a raffle for an iPad Mini as appreciation for their 
support. 
In order to reduce the perceived costs of completing the survey, the 
survey questions were kept relatively simple; the time required to seek 
information was minimized. With the exception of a few demographic questions 
such as gender, personal information was not requested, and responses were 
anonymous (Dillman, 2000).   
Full Sample 
The personnel with the requisite knowledge of contractor performance 
were those who served as CPARS assessing officials. In pursuit of a sample size 
sufficient to test the model, the survey was presented to 2,247 assessing officials 
in defense organizations. From those invited, 148 responses were received. 
However, 58 of those responses were incomplete resulting in 90 usable 
responses. The records from the pilot study were then added to the data set. 
This combined sample of 131 respondents out of 2,512 resulted in a response 
rate of 5.2%.   
Demographics 
 The average dollar value of the contracts was $164.7 million (std. dev. 
$971.8M; range: $62K-$10B). The respondents’ average years of experience 
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assessing contractor performance was 14.75 (std. dev. 9.5). Demographics 
characterizing the respondents and the contracts for which they responded are 
found in the ensuing tables. The sample was respectably educated. Assessing 
officials, although were mostly program managers, represented a variety of job 
functions. Respondent ages were evenly distributed across ten-year groups.  
Most respondents were male (72%), which is somewhat skewed compared to 
total U.S. government employment (57%) (Office of Personnel Management, 
2014). The sample is heavily influenced by services versus construction and 
goods. Professional services dominate the service category. Most transactions 
were completed, and large and small businesses are evenly represented. All 
major contract types are represented; however, most are firm-fixed price and 
cost reimbursement. Thirty percent of contracts contained incentives (award fee, 
incentive fee, award term, performance-based payments, and/or liquidated 
damages). Tables 2-11 further describe the sample and provide insight to the 
extent of generalizability of the results.   
Table 2.  Highest Education Attained 
Degree Type Frequency 
High School 12 
Associates 8 
Bachelors 31 
Masters 74 
Doctorate 2 
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Table 3.  Assessing Official Career Field 
Group Frequency 
Quality Assurance 3 
Program Management 50 
Contracting 18 
Engineering 26 
Logistics 12 
Other 19 
 
Table 4.  Performance Assessing Experience 
Years Frequency 
0 - 9 39 
10 - 19 47 
20 - 29 28 
30 - 39 11 
40 - 49 2 
 
Table 5.  Gender 
Type Frequency Percentage 
Male 91 71.7 
Female 36 28.3 
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Table 6.  Purchase Type 
Type Frequency 
Services 93 
Construction 4 
Supplies/Commodities/Spares 17 
Weapon System 1 
Other 13 
 
 
Table 7.  Competition 
Type Frequency Percentage 
Competed 90 70.3 
Not Competed 38 29.7 
 
 
Table 8.  Business Size 
Type Frequency Percentage 
Small Business 63 49.2 
Large Business 65 50.8 
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Table 9.  Type Of Contract 
Type Frequency 
Firm-Fixed Price 77 
Cost Reimbursement 38 
Time and Materials 3 
Labor-Hour 1 
Hybrid 11 
Other (e.g., Basic Ordering Agreement) 1 
 
Table 10.  Contract Value 
Type Frequency 
< $1 Million 13 
$1 - 4.99 Million 32 
$5 - 24.99 Million 42 
$25 - 49.99 Million 11 
$50 - 99.99 Million 7 
$100 - 499.99 Million 9 
$500 – 999.99 Million 2 
$1 – 4.99 Billion 2 
> $5 Billion 1 
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Table 11.  Product Service Code/Federal Supply Class 
PSC/FSC Frequency 
A -  Research and Development (R&D) 11 
B - Special Studies and Analyses 2 
C - Architect and Engineering Services 4 
D - Automatic Data Processing and 
Telecommunication 
11 
F -  Natural Resources Management 1 
J -  Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of 
Equipment 
12 
K - Modification of Equipment 1 
L - Technical Representative 2 
M - Operation of Government Owned 
Facilities 
1 
Q - Medical Services 3 
R - Professional, Administrative and 
Management Support 
34 
S - Utilities and Housekeeping Services 3 
U - Education and Training 1 
V - Transportation, Travel and Relocation 4 
W - Lease or Rental of Equipment 1 
Y - Construction of Structures and Facilities 1 
Z -  Maintenance, Repair or Alteration of Real 
Property 
2 
10 - Weapons 3 
12 - Fire Control Equipment 2 
14 - Guided Missiles 1 
15 - Aircraft and Airframe Structural 
Components 
6 
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Table 11.  Product Service Code/Federal Supply Class 
(continued) 
PSC/FSC Frequency 
16 - Aircraft Components and Accessories 4 
17 - Aircraft Launching, Landing, and Ground 
Handling Equipment 
1 
18 - Space Vehicles 1 
19 - Ships, Small Craft, Pontoons, and 
Floating Docks 
2 
28 - Engines, Turbines, and Components 1 
35 - Service and Trade Equipment 1 
39 - Materials Handling Equipment 1 
58 - Communication, Detection and Coherent 
Radiation Equipment 
2 
59 - Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
Components 
1 
69 - Training Aids and Devices 1 
70 - Automated Data Processing Equipment 
(Including Firmware), Software, Supplies, 
and Support Equipment 
4 
71 - Furniture 1 
72 - Household and Commercial Furnishings 
and Appliances 
1 
91 - Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, and Waxes 1 
99 - Miscellaneous 3 
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Measure Evaluation 
Normality 
Tests for skewness and kurtosis revealed that most item z-scores for 
skewness were greater than an absolute value of three, suggesting that the data 
for most items was skewed (Kline, 1997).  Skewness was visually apparent from 
the histogram of each item.  Conversely, only items measuring fairness and one 
item measuring rating dissonance (D4) showed an absolute value of kurtosis z-
scores greater than ten (Kline, 1997).  PLS SEM is a non-parametric method; it 
does not require that data be normally distributed.  “PLS-SEM is suitable for 
applications where strong assumptions cannot be fully met and is often referred 
to as a distribution-free ‘soft modeling approach’” (Hair et al., 2012, p. 416).  As a 
test, each scale item of the ten latent constructs that violated normality was 
transformed to fall within the thresholds stated above.  A variety of 
transformations were used including squared, cubed, 4th power, 5th power, 
Log10, and inverse; however, the same transformation was used for all items of 
any single construct in order to keep each scale consistent.  The model below 
was re-run with more normalized items.  The path coefficient effects and 
statistical significances were nearly identical. Data transformations made no 
appreciable change in the model.  Thus, all ensuing analyses are based on non-
transformed data. 
Bias 
A major concern in cross-sectional survey research is response bias, 
particularly coverage bias, selection bias, non-response bias (Blair and Zinkhan, 
2006), and socially desirable responding (SDR). Coverage bias occurs when, 
due to research methods, a particular group is excluded from the population 
(Blair and Zinkhan, 2006). This research design excluded for-profit sector buyers; 
thus, results will need to be examined carefully prior to generalizing to this 
context.  Otherwise, considering the breadth of demographic representation 
shown above, coverage bias is not a concern.    
Non-response bias occurs when a particular group(s) fails to respond to 
the survey. Non-response bias was evaluated by comparing responses from 
early and late respondents. The rationale for this approach is that late 
respondents sufficiently resemble non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 
1977).  A chi-square test showed no difference across a key demographic, 
gender. Independent samples t-tests explored any differences in 15 constructs 
measured by continuous measures. Only one difference was found (in role 
  Acquisition Research Program 
      Graduate School of Business & Public Policy      - 32 - 
        Naval Postgraduate School  
overload, which seems logical; busy people might have procrastinated). These 
results suggests that the sample was not affected by a non-response bias.       
SDR is “the tendency to give answers that make the respondent look 
good” (Paulhus, 1991, p. 17). This natural tendency may obfuscate the truth; 
thus, SDR can seriously jeopardize the validity of survey research (Randall and 
Fernandes, 1991; Nunnally, 1978).  “SD[R] can act as (1) an unmeasured 
variable that produces spurious correlations between study variables, (2) a 
suppressor variable that hides relationships, or (3) a moderator variable that 
conditions the relationship between two other variables” (Ganster et al.,1983, p. 
321). Some tools are available to the researcher to control the influence of SDR 
(Paulhus, 1991; Randall and Fernandes, 1991). This research included a 
demand reduction technique (anonymity) to reduce the respondent’s motivation 
to respond in a socially acceptable way. The research design collected data 
anonymously. This is consistent with other similar research of situations 
encountered by procurement professionals making procurement-related 
decisions (Landeros and Plank, 1996).   
Since cross-sectional survey-based data entails multiple variables 
measured from a single source, common method bias must be of concern.  
Harmon’s one-factor test showed that when latent-indicator items were forced 
onto a single factor in exploratory factor analysis (EFA), the 58 items accounted 
for 33.13% of the variance in the common method factor, which is significantly 
less than 50% recommended (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Therefore, common 
method bias is not great enough to affect the results.    
Reliability and Validity  
To assess reliability and validity, first, a measurement model of constructs 
measured by reflective indicators was run using partial least squares (PLS) 
structural equation modeling (SEM).  Similar to the pilot test, the reliability of 
latent constructs was assessed using composite reliability, a measure of internal 
consistency reliability.  The composite reliability of each construct (Table 14) was 
compared to the generally accepted standard of 0.7 for established scales and 
0.6 for new scales (Nunnally, 1978).  Each construct exceeded the 0.7 threshold.   
Reliability is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for validity (Kerlinger 
and Lee, 2000). Another aspect of validity that must be satisfied is to ensure that 
what is actually measured corresponds with what was intended to be measured.  
This aspect of validity addresses the accuracy of the measures.It was assessed 
via construct, convergent, and discriminant validity.  Specifically, construct 
validity was assessed using principle components EFA with a Varimax rotation.  
All predictor constructs were run together in an EFA. Individual items were 
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assessed for sufficient correlation with the factor (factor loading), greater than 
0.6, while simultaneously ensuring cross-loadings were less than 0.4. Items were 
iteratively trimmed until these thresholds were met. In a confirmatory manner 
(rather than exploratory), the items were forced on to the hypothesized number of 
factors. However, leverage attitude clearly split into two separate factors.     
 Convergent validity was established by examining average variance 
extracted (AVE).  The AVE for each construct far exceeded the 0.5 threshold 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981).   Convergent validity was further assessed by 
examining the completely standardized factor loadings (Table 12).  All loadings 
are statistically significant and all but one (SPE5) exceed the recommended .50 
level (Hair et al., 2010).  SPE5 was retained for its theoretical value in 
expounding on the meaning of SPE by incorporating the concept of supplier 
motivation.  Discriminant validity was established by examining the squared 
correlation between each pair of constructs compared to the AVE for each 
associated construct (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).  In each case, the AVE is 
significantly greater than the squared correlations (Table 13).  Discriminant 
validity was also examined using the heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio of 
correlations (Henseler et al., 2015) that compares the ratio of the within-construct 
correlations to the between-construct correlations.  All HTMT ratios were less 
than the recommended 0.85.  Overall, the constructs were deemed to be of 
sufficient reliability and construct validity.  Table 14 presents the means, standard 
deviations, scale reliabilities, and correlations for these constructs. 
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Table 12.  Factor Loadings 
 
Accuracy 
Comm. 
Formal i ty Fa i rness  
Fear of 
Dispute 
Leverage 
Atti tude 
SPE 
Efficacy 
Perceived 
Usefulness  
Rating 
Dissonance 
Rating 
Justi fication 
Relationship 
Qual i ty 
Role 
Overload 
Sufficiency of 
Requirement 
Defini tion Survei llance 
A10 0.904             
A6 0.805             
A7 0.852             
A9 0.881             
BF1   0.927           
BF2   0.952           
BF3   0.907           
BF4   0.934           
BF5   0.872           
CForm2  0.954            
CForm3  0.962            
CForm5  0.896            
FD1    0.794          
FD2    0.816          
FD3    0.708          
FD4    0.879          
L1     0.902         
L2     0.89         
D1           0.93       
D3           0.94       
D4       0.871       
SPE1           0.859   
SPE2           0.902   
SPE3           0.878   
SPE4           0.936   
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Table 12.  Factor Loadings (continued) 
 Accuracy 
Comm. 
Formal i ty Fa i rness  
Fear of 
Dispute 
Leverage 
Atti tude 
SPE 
Efficacy 
Perceived 
Usefulness  
Rating 
Dissonance 
Rating 
Justi fication 
Relationship 
Qual i ty 
Role 
Overload 
Sufficiency of 
Requirement 
Defini tion Survei llance 
SPE5           0.414   
SPE6           0.916   
PU1      0.908        
PU10      0.818        
PU2        0.94        
PU3      0.829        
PU4      0.936        
PU9      0.819        
RD1            0.918  
RD2            0.925  
RD3            0.902  
RD4            0.923  
RD5            0.903  
RJ2            0.92      
RJ3        0.898      
RJ5        0.908      
RO1          0.829    
RO2          0.893    
RO3          0.845    
RO4          0.906    
RQS2         0.929     
RQS3         0.922     
RQS5         0.711     
RQT1         0.916     
RQT2         0.946     
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Table 12.  Factor Loadings (continued) 
 Accuracy 
Comm. 
Formal i ty Fa i rness  
Fear of 
Dispute 
Leverage 
Atti tude 
SPE 
Efficacy 
Perceived 
Usefulness  
Rating 
Dissonance 
Rating 
Justi fication 
Relationship 
Qual i ty 
Role 
Overload 
Sufficiency of 
Requirement 
Defini tion Survei llance 
RQT3         0.951     
RQT4         0.922     
RQT5         0.871     
RQT6         0.934     
S1             0.933 
S2             0.942 
S3             0.959 
S4             0.933 
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Table 13.  Discriminant Validity 
 
 Accuracy 
Comm. 
Formality 
Buyer 
Fairness 
Fear of 
Dispute 
Leverage 
Attitude 
SPE 
Efficacy 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
Rating 
Dissonance 
Rating 
Justif ication 
Relationship 
Quality 
Role 
Overload 
Sufficiency of 
Requirement 
Definition Surveillance 
Accuracy 0.74             
Comm. Formality 0.18 0.88            
Fairness 0.40 0.12 0.84           
Fear of Dispute 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.64          
Leverage 
Attitude 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.80         
SPE Efficacy 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.77        
Perceived 
Usefulness 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.84       
Rating 
Dissonance 0.32 0.16 0.29 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.83      
Rating 
Justif ication 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.82     
Relationship 
Quality 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.76    
Role Overload 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.27 0.27 0.09 0.70   
Suff iciency of 
Requirement 
Definition 0.43 0.14 0.32 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.31 0.18 0.13 0.31 0.84  
Surveillance 0.09 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.16 0.05 0.89 
AVE is show n on the diagonal. 
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Table 14.  Construct Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilitiesab and Correlations 
Construct Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
1. Rating Justification 5.72 1.3 (.80)            
     
2. Surveillance 5.36 1.52 .32** (.97)           
     
3. Communication 
Formality 5.0 1.79 .40** .43** (.96)          
     
4. Role Overload 3.20 2.02 -.26** -.09 -.36** (.92)         
     
5. Perceived Usefulness 3.71 1.93 .29** .29** .45** -.17* (.95)        
     
6. Relationship Quality 5.69 1.51 .40** .35** .40** -.23** .18* (.97)       
     
7. Buyer Fairness  6.41 0.95 .54** .46** .34** -.17 .22* .43** (.97)      
     
8. Leverage Attitudeb 2.53 1.97 -.09 -.08 -.32** .19* -.08 -.16 -.07 (.90)     
     
9. Fear of Supplier Dispute 2.15 1.69 -.28** -.24** -.32** .35** -.16 -.51** -.42** .32** (.88)    
     
10. Perceived Accuracy 5.57 2.36 .56** .30** .42** -.25** .21* .41** .62** -.24** -.40** (.92)   
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Table 14.  Construct Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilitiesab and Correlations 
(continued) 
Construct Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
11. Rating Dissonance 2.21 1.66 -.19* -.15 -.07 .27** .09 -.27** -.33** .07 .47** -.29** (.94)  
     
12. Sufficiency of 
Requirement 
Definition 
5.22 1.54 .55** .22* .38** -.35** .22* .41** .56** -.14 -.37** .65** -.30** (.97) 
     
13. SPE Efficacy 5.47 1.29 .48** .40** .49** -.22* .44** .50** .40** -.07 -.29** .38** -.21* .50** (.93)    
 
14. Communication Bi-
directionalityb 
5.15 1.65 .38** .42** .44** -.05 .25** .30** .25** -.11 -.08 .31** .04 .22* .19* (.72)   
 
15. Communication 
Frequencyc 
3.92 1.08 .29** .27** .22* .01 .22* .09 .10 .05 .11 .13 .12 .10 .20* .52** -  
 
16. Turnoverc d .480 .502 -.08 -.11 -.06 .17 -.07 -.20 -.07 -.04 .12 .00 .05 -.12 .11 -.10 -.15 - 
 
17. Hoursc 18.1 21.7 -.06 -.11 -.03 -.05 .01 -.19* -.29** .07 .13 -.35** .22* -.27** -.14 .03 .11 -.06 
- 
**Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
a
Composite Reliabilities are presented on the diagonal.  
b
Spearman-Brown split-half reliability for 2-item scale.  
c
Single-item scale.  
d
Binary variable. 
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Results - Quantitative 
 The model was tested using partial least squares (PLS) structural equation 
modeling (SEM). PLS SEM, versus covariance-based SEM, is the valid modeling 
approach when the model includes formative scales (Hair et al., 2014).  PLS SEM 
also accommodates complex models with a large number of variables, can model 
non-normally distributed data, and does not pose problems with convergence often 
found in covariance-based SEM.  It is also more appropriate for small sample sizes 
and models with binary predictor variables – both of which characterize this research 
(Hair et al., 2014). Given the small sample size, the research design was examined 
to ensure sufficient power to detect hypothesized effects. Seeking power of 80 
percent, assuming a significance level of .05 and a minimum R-squared of .25, and 
ten times the maximum number of predictor parameters per construct to be 
estimated (in this case, eight), the minimum sample size was 80 (Hair et al., 2014).  
Thus, the sample of 133 cases was deemed sufficient to apply PLS SEM to test the 
model. Results are shown in Table 15. 
 In assessing the PLS SEM model, first multi-collinearity must be checked.  
Since no variance inflation factors exceeded the threshold of 5, multi-collinearity 
posed no concern. 
Table 15.  PLS Results of Estimated Path Coefficients and Effects 
 Standardized Path Coefficients 
 Hypothesis Standardized 
Path Coefficient 
Hypothesis 
(not) 
Supported 
Direct Effects    
Rating DissonanceSPE Efficacy H1 -.15* S 
Rating DissonanceHours H2 .13 NS 
Perceived AccuracyHours H3 -.29** S 
Perceived Accuracy Fear of Supplier Dispute H4 -.23** S 
Fear of Supplier DisputeRating Dissonance H5 .38*** S 
Sufficiency of Requirement DefinitionRating 
Dissonance 
H6 -.07 NS 
Sufficiency of Requirement 
DefinitionPerceived Accuracy 
H7 .41*** S 
TurnoverPerceived Accuracy H8 .07 NS 
Perceived AccuracyRating Dissonance H9 -.05 NS 
Perceived AccuracySPE Efficacy H10 .17 NS 
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Communication Frequencey (binary) 
Perceived Accuracy 
H11 -.03 NS 
Communication Bi-directionality(binary) 
Perceived Accuracy 
H12 .12 PS
††
 
Communication Formality(binary) Perceived 
Accuracy 
H13 .08 PS
†
 
Role Overload Rating Justification H14 -.09 PS
†
 
Role OverloadRating Dissonance H15 .13 PS
††
 
Perceived UsefulnessRating Justification H16 .17*** S 
Perceived AccuracyRating Justification H17 .51*** S 
Rating Justification SPE Efficacy H18 .40*** S 
Perceived AccuracyPerceived Usefulness H19 .22*** S 
Relationship QualityFear of Supplier Dispute H20 -.43*** S 
Communication Frequencey Relationship 
Quality 
H21 -.07 NS 
Communication Bi-directionalityRelationship 
Quality 
H22 .29** S 
Communication FormalityRelationship Quality H23 .31*** S 
TurnoverRelationship Quality H24 -.16** S 
SurveillancePerceived Accuracy H25 -.03 NS 
FairnessPerceived Accuracy H26 .36*** S 
Leverage AttitudePerceived Accuracy H27 -.14** S 
 Variance 
Explained 
(adjusted R
2
) 
Q
2
  
SPE Efficacy 31% .15  
Rating Dissonance 23% .20  
Perceived Accuracy 56% .41  
Perceived Usefulness 4% .03  
Rating Justification 35% .29  
Fear of Supplier Dispute 31% .18  
Relationship Quality 25% .21  
Hours 11% .08  
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01 
†
Partially supported via ANOVA,
 
explained below; 
††
Partially supported via regression,
 
explained 
below. 
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 Next, effect sizes were evaluated. Q2 is a measure of the model’s out-of-
sample predictive relevance. As seen in Table 15, all Q2 values are greater than 
zero, indicating predictive relevance of the exogenous construct predicting the 
endogenous (i.e., dependent) constructs in the model. The effect size standards for 
Q2 are the same as those for f2.  The f2 statistics indicate the effects as follows: .02 
values are small, .15 values are medium, and .35 are large (Hair et al., 2014). The f2 
statistics (Tables 16-19) indicate how much a particular relationship contributes to 
the percentage of variance explained in the dependent variable (i.e., the coefficient 
of multiple determination, adjusted R2).   
Overall, support was found for 15 of the 27 hypotheses.  Of the significant 
relationships, one effect size was large (perceived accuracyrating justification), 
four were medium (rating justificationSPE efficacy; relationship qualityfear of 
supplier dispute; sufficiency of requirement definitionperceived accuracy; and 
fairnessperceived accuracy), and the remaining ten relationships were small.  The 
effect sizes indicate the most impactful paths (i.e., chain of relationships) to SPE 
efficacy.  It appears that the most impactful constructs explaining SPE efficacy (i.e., 
its chain of effects) involve rating justification, perceived accuracy, sufficiency of 
requirement definition, and fairness.  While others are also significant, their effects 
are relatively smaller. 
 Similar to ordinary least square regression, PLS SEM path coefficients 
represent the estimated change in the endogenous construct per unit of change in a 
predictor construct. Examining the standardized path coefficients, the effect of rating 
justification on SPE efficacy is more than twice that of rating dissonance. Examining 
the effects on rating justification, perceived accuracy has a far greater effect than 
does perceived usefulness. Further, perceived accuracy also affects perceived 
usefulness. Looking further back in the model, examining the effects on perceived 
accuracy, the sufficiency of the requirement definition has the greatest impact, 
followed closely by fairness. Leverage attitude also affects perceived accuracy, but 
not nearly as strongly. Fear of supplier dispute is affected by relationship quality. 
Rating dissonance is affected only by fear of supplier dispute.    
 The effect of accuracy on SPE efficacy appears to be fully mediated by rating 
justification.  In addition, although the perceived usefulness at least partially 
mediates the relationship between perceived accuracy and rating justification, the 
total effect of perceived accuracy on rating justification dominates.  Simi larly, 
perceived accuracy does not affect rating dissonance directly, but does through a 
mediated relationship with fear of supplier dispute.    
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Table 16.  Effect Sizes 
 
 SPE Efficacy Rating Dissonance 
 Path 
Coefficient 
f 2 
 Path 
Coefficient 
f 2 
 
Rating 
Dissonance 
-.15 .03    
 
Perceived 
Accuracy 
.17 .03  -.05 .00 
 
Rating 
Justification 
.40 .16    
 
Role 
Overload 
   .13 .02 
 
Fear of 
Supplier 
Dispute 
   .38 .14 
 
Sufficiency 
of 
Requirement 
Definition 
   -.07 .00 
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Table 17.  Effect Sizes 
 
 Rating Justification  Perceived Usefulness 
 Path 
Coefficient 
f 2 
  Path 
Coefficient 
f 2 
 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
.17 .04     
 
Perceived 
Accuracy .51 .36   .22 .05 
 
Role 
Overload -.09 .01     
 
 
 
Table 18.  Effect Sizes 
 
 Hours  Relationship Quality 
 Path 
Coefficient 
f 2 
  Path 
Coefficient 
f 2 
 
Rating 
Dissonance .13 .02     
 
Perceived 
Accuracy -.29 .09     
 
Communication 
Frequency     -.07 .01 
 
Communication 
Bi-directionality     .29 .09 
 
Communication 
Formality     .31 .11 
 
Turnover     -.16 .03 
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Table 19.  Effect Sizes 
 
 Perceived Accuracy Fear of Supplier Dispute 
 Path 
Coefficient 
f 2 
 Path 
Coefficient 
f 2 
 
Relationship 
Quality 
   
-.43 .22 
 
Perceived 
Accuracy 
   
-.23 .07 
 
Sufficiency of 
Requirement 
Definition 
.41 
.26     
Turnover .07 .01    
 
Fairness .36 .18     
Leverage 
Attitude 
-.14 .04     
Communication 
Frequency 
-.03 .00    
 
Communication 
Bi-directionality 
.12 .03    
 
Communication 
Formality 
.08 .01    
 
Surveillance -.03 .00    
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Post Hoc Analyses 
 Table 14 displays construct means and standard deviations.  Overall, 
respondents in the sample reported SPEs as somewhat accurate (mean 5.57), and 
this construct varied more than any other (SD 2.36).  Of the 131 respondents, 91 
agreed or strongly agreed that SPEs were effective, whereas 40 (30.5%) expressed 
doubt.  The sample also exhibited much variance in role overload (SD 2.02).  
Leverage attitude was somewhat low across the sample (mean 2.53), but it also 
varied highly (SD 1.97), as did perceived usefulness (SD 1.93).  Respondents 
overall were slightly less than neutral concerning the utility of the CPAR process 
and supporting information technology system, and this sentiment varied within the 
sample (mean 3.71, SD 1.93).  Also, respondents overall did not exhibit a fear of 
supplier dispute; however, this varied (SD 1.69).  Respondents believed that their 
evaluations were highly fair (mean 6.41) and this varied little (SD 0.95).  
Respondents also believed their ratings were somewhat justified (mean 5.72, SD 
1.3). Finally, in general, respondents believe SPEs are somewhat effective (mean 
5.47, SD 1.29). Additionally, the mean of the component of SPE efficacy that 
gauges the supplier’s motivation to perform (4.37) was noticeably lower than the 
mean of the overall SPE efficacy construct. Thus, some evidence suggests that 
respondents are less confident that SPEs are effective in motivating supplier 
performance than they are that SPEs mitigate the risk of future adverse selection.  
Further, respondents were asked to rate the extent to which an SPE rating 
influenced an award decision of the most recent source selection in which they 
participated (and in which past performance was an evaluation criterion).  
Responses were neutral (mean 4.35) but varied (SD 2.21).   
As an intended indicator of accuracy (but was trimmed out during EFA), 
respondents were asked to rate the level of inflated ratings.  The average was low 
(1.95), but responses varied (SD 1.53).  Thus, groups were created of high (n=22) 
and low (n=109) inflation (cut point 4 on a 7-point scale).  Groups were then created 
of high (n=96) and low (n=35) SPE Efficacy.  Crosstabulation analysis examined 
differences between the actual versus expected counts of responses that had, for 
example, high inflation and low SPE efficacy and high inflation and high SPE 
efficacy.  The differences between actual and expected counts were significant (χ2 
= 4.74, p<.05).  There were more actual counts of high inflation and low SPE 
efficacy than expected, and simultaneously lower actual counts than expected 
counts in the high inflation and high SPE efficacy groups (Table 20) suggesting a 
relationship between rating inflation and SPE efficacy.  Furthermore, an 
independent samples t-test showed that the mean value of SPE efficacy among the 
high inflation group was 4.40 lower (using a summated, 6-item scale) than the low 
inflation group (p<.01). 
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Table 20.  Rating Inflation & SPE Efficacy Crosstabs 
Inflbin * SPEEffbin Crosstabulation 
 
SPEEffbin 
Total .00 1.00 
Inflbin .00 Count 25 84 109 
Expected Count 29.1 79.9 109.0 
% within Inflbin 22.9% 77.1% 100.0% 
1.00 Count 10 12 22 
Expected Count 5.9 16.1 22.0 
% within Inflbin 45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 35 96 131 
Expected Count 35.0 96.0 131.0 
% within Inflbin 26.7% 73.3% 100.0% 
 
 
Inflated ratings appear to also relate to perceived accuracy.  An independent 
samples t-test showed that the mean value of perceived accuracy among the high 
inflation group was 4.45 lower (using a summated, 4-item scale) than the low 
inflation group (p<.001).  Similarly, highly inflated ratings appear to be related to 
rating dissonance.  An independent samples t-test showed that the mean value of 
rating dissonance among the high inflation group was 4.21 greater (using a 
summated, 3-item scale) than the low inflation group (p<.001).   
Inflated ratings are also related to fear of supplier dispute.  A logistic 
regression model was run with a binary dependent variable, inflation (1=high; 
0=low).  This dependent variable was regressed on fear of supplier dispute and 
leverage attitude.  The omnibus chi-Square test (χ2 = 46.88, p < .001) was 
significant.  Additionally, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (χ2 =8.21, p < .223) 
showed no difference between predicted and actual classifications.  The portion of 
explained variance was respectable as evidenced by the Cox and Snell R2 of .16 
and the Nagelkerke R2 of .27.  Practical significance was evidenced by a 
reasonable hit ratio of 83.2%.  Fear of supplier dispute had a significant effect at the 
.05 level (Table 21).  Since these variables were not normally distributed, they were 
transformed.  The transformed variables were then tested (Table 22) yielding the 
same results.  The transformed variables rendered the sizes of the Beta coefficients 
miniscule and uninterpretable.  Reflecting back to the untransformed Beta values, 
the model shows that fear of supplier dispute is positively related to rating inflation 
(B = 1.24). 
        Acquisition Research Program 
        Graduate School of Business & Public Policy                                             - 49 - 
        Naval Postgraduate School  
Table 21.  Effect of Fear of Supplier Dispute on Rating Inflation 
 
 
Table 22.  Effect of Fear of Supplier Dispute on Rating Inflation - Transformed 
 
Respondents were also asked to rate agreement with the following 
statement: “It is futile to report the real ratings that the contractor deserves since 
management will either change the ratings or make me change the ratings.”  While 
the mean level of agreement was low (2.23), responses varied (SD 1.74).  Thirteen 
respondents rated this question as a 6 or 7 (7 = strongly agree).  Twenty five 
respondents (19%) reported that someone on the buyer team either changed or 
influenced a change to the SPE for reasons shown in Figure 2.  Of those, nine 
evaluators (36%) disagreed with the change made.  Note that a respondent may 
have more than one reason.  Thus, the 13 SPEs that had insufficient facts may be 
the same 13 for which a supplier’s rebuttal had merit.  In any event, there were 10 
percent of SPEs that had trouble mustering facts to support the rating(s) that the 
assessing official believed the supplier deserved.   
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Figure 2.  Reasons For Rating Changes  
SPEs ratings have been reported to be incomplete – a phenomenon that was 
confirmed in the sample.  Forty four respondents (33.5%) reported that their SPE 
included at least one rating category that was not complete.  Groups were created 
of high/low levels of perceived usefulness, accuracy, role overload, and 
communication bi-directionality.  Then, crosstabulation analyses (Tables 23-25) 
examined differences between the expected counts and actual counts in each 
combination groups (high/low levels of each variable and groups with and without 
incomplete ratings).  Role overload was not significant (χ2 = .091, p=.81).  
However, perceived usefulness (χ2 = 4.17, p<.05), perceived accuracy (χ2 = 5.67, 
p<.01), and communication bi-directionality (χ2 = 9.17, p<.01) were each 
significantly different than expected suggesting that each is related to incomplete 
SPEs.   
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Table 23.  Incomplete SPEs and Perceived Usefulness Crosstabs 
Incompletebin * PUbin Crosstabulation 
 
PUbin 
Total .00 1.00 
Incompletebin .00 Count 43 44 87 
Expected Count 48.5 38.5 87.0 
% of Total 32.8% 33.6% 66.4% 
1.00 Count 30 14 44 
Expected Count 24.5 19.5 44.0 
% of Total 22.9% 10.7% 33.6% 
Total Count 73 58 131 
Expected Count 73.0 58.0 131.0 
% of Total 55.7% 44.3% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 24.  Incomplete SPEs and Perceived Accuracy Crosstabs 
Incompletebin * Accuracybin Crosstabulation 
 
Accuracybin 
Total .00 1.00 
Incompletebin .00 Count 51 36 87 
Expected Count 57.1 29.9 87.0 
% of Total 38.9% 27.5% 66.4% 
1.00 Count 35 9 44 
Expected Count 28.9 15.1 44.0 
% of Total 26.7% 6.9% 33.6% 
Total Count 86 45 131 
Expected Count 86.0 45.0 131.0 
% of Total 65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
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Table 25.  Incomplete SPEs and Communication Bi-Directionality Crosstabs 
Incompletebin * CBbinary Crosstabulation 
 
CBbinary 
Total .00 1.00 
Incompletebin .00 Count 16 71 87 
Expected Count 23.2 63.8 87.0 
% of Total 12.2% 54.2% 66.4% 
1.00 Count 19 25 44 
Expected Count 11.8 32.2 44.0 
% of Total 14.5% 19.1% 33.6% 
Total Count 35 96 131 
Expected Count 35.0 96.0 131.0 
% of Total 26.7% 73.3% 100.0% 
 
 
Several regression models were run to explore the effects of the type of buy 
(e.g., services, construction, commodities, spares, weapon systems, or capital 
equipment).  Services were coded 1; others were coded zero.  When rating 
justification was regressed against perceived usefulness, perceived accuracy, and 
type of buy (binary), type of buy was significant (F=22.66, standardized B=.16, 
t=2.13, p<.05).  Thus, more extensive rating justifications were related to buying 
services.  Together, these three predictor variables explained 33% of the variance 
in rating justification.  Note that transformed values were used in this model due to 
non-normal data.  Logically, controlling for the known effects of perceived accuracy, 
the type of buy (services) was also related to lower perceived usefulness (F=6.46, 
standardized B=-.22, t=-2.57, p<.01).  Neither SPE Efficacy, rating dissonance, nor 
perceived accuracy were related to the type of buy (binary).   
Twenty five respondents (19%) reported that the supplier disputed at least 
one rating and/or rating justification.  Within the 25, 45 ratings were challenged.  
Post hoc tests explored factors contributing to supplier rebuttals to ratings and/or 
narrative justifications.  A logistic regression model was run with a binary dependent 
variable, disagreement (1=disagreed; 0=did not disagree). This dependent variable 
was regressed on relationship quality, rating justification, perceived accuracy, and 
buyer fairness.  The omnibus chi-Square test (χ2 = 21.61, p < .001) was significant.  
Additionally, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (χ2 =12.98, p < .112) showed no 
difference between predicted and actual classifications.  The portion of explained 
variance was respectable as evidenced by the Cox and Snell R2 of .15 and the 
Nagelkerke R2 of .24. Practical significance was evidenced by a reasonable hit ratio 
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of 80.2%. Two factors were found to be significant (Table 26) at the .05 level, 
relationship quality and perceived accuracy.  Table 26 shows the untransformed 
variables tested.  However, since these variables were not normally distributed, 
they were transformed.  The transformed variables were then tested (Table 27) 
yielding the same results but with much lower probabilities of a type I error (i.e., 
greater statistical significance).  The transformed variables rendered the sizes of 
the Beta coefficients miniscule and uninterpretable.  Reflecting back to the 
untransformed Beta values, the model shows that higher accuracy of the SPE       
(B = -.102) decreases disagreement as does higher relationship quality (B = -.045).   
 
Table 26.  Logistic Regression, Supplier Disagreement – Untransformed 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Accuracy -.102 .062 2.695 1 .101 .903 
Fa irness -.082 .069 1.422 1 .233 .922 
CommFormality .008 .060 .017 1 .896 1.008 
CommBidirection -.059 .099 .354 1 .552 .943 
RatingJust .045 .085 .282 1 .595 1.046 
RelQlty -.045 .020 4.986 1 .026 .956 
Constant 5.217 2.098 6.186 1 .013 184.367 
a . Variable(s) entered on step 1: Accuracy, Fa irness, CommFormality, CommBidirection, RatingJust, RelQlty.  
 
 
 
Table 27.  Logistic Regression, Supplier Disagreement - Transformed 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a RQ4th .000 .000 7.036 1 .008 1.000 
RJcubed .000 .000 .937 1 .333 1.000 
A4th .000 .000 3.727 1 .054 1.000 
BF5th .000 .000 .896 1 .344 1.000 
CBSq -.004 .006 .508 1 .476 .996 
CFSq .000 .002 .015 1 .904 1.000 
Constant 1.081 .779 1.927 1 .165 2.947 
a . Variable(s) entered on step 1: RQ4th, RJcubed, A4th, BF5th, CBSq, CFSq. 
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 Overall, rating dissonance in the sample was low (mean 2.21); however, 
levels of dissonance varied (SD 1.66).  Excluding the pilot study data (due to an 
ambiguity in the pilot survey), each contract utilized several supplier performance 
evaluators (mean 7.11, median 4, range 1-100).  Appendix E shows reasons for 
rater dissonance.  The dissonance pertained to differences of perspective of 
multiple evaluators, different interpretations of the definitions of ratings, confusion 
over the work (not) required by a contract, fear of supplier rebuttal, insufficient 
rating justification, inadequately-defined requirements, whether to not penalize a 
supplier that self-identifies and resolves a problem, and uncertainty as to the level 
of performance that constitutes exceeding the requirement in a way that is 
sufficiently beneficial to the buyer.  From these sources of dissonance, different 
interpretations and definitions of ratings were by far the most prevalent.   
 Rating justification was also found to be affected by the sufficiency of rating 
definitions.  A regression of the transformed values in the full sample supported a 
linear relationship (F=43.47, p<.001).  Combined, accuracy, perceived usefulness, 
and rating definition explained 59% of the variance in rating justification.  A 
sufficient rating definition had a significant, positive effect on rating justification 
(standardized B=.64, p<.001).  Again, it should be noted that sufficiency of rating 
definition was measured using a single-item scale; thus, its reliability could not be 
determined and was thus not included in the PLS SEM model. 
  In the PLS SEM model, linear relationships between role overload and rating 
justification and between role overload and rating dissonance were not found.  
However, two groups were created – those with low and high role overload.  There 
were 22 cases in the high overload group.  The cut point was scores (1-7) greater 
than 5.0. Two independent samples t-tests showed differences in mean values of 
rating justification (t=-2.136, p<.05) and in rating dissonance (t=2.617, p<.01) 
between the two groups, suggesting an effect of role overload.  The mean value of 
the summated scale of rating dissonance was 2.68 greater for the high role 
overload group compared to the low role overload group.  The mean value of 
summated scale of rating justification was 1.56 lower for the high role overload 
group compared to the low role overload group.  These differences are consistent 
with the directions of the hypothesized effects (H14 and H15); thus, partial support 
is found for these hypotheses.  A further investigation of these relationships 
involved the use of polar extremes.  The cases with middle values of role overload 
were removed from the sample (summated values of 9-19, four-item scale, n=76).  
Rating justification was regressed on polar role overload (binary coded as high/low) 
along with accuracy and perceived usefulness.  Role overload was not significant.  
Next, rating dissonance was regressed on polar role overload along with perceived 
accuracy and fear of supplier dispute.  The model was significant (F=9.09, p<.001), 
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and role overload was significant (standardized B=.24, t=2.12, p< .05). Together, 
these three variables accounted for 24% of the variance in rating dissonance.    
In 48 cases (37%), prior to initiating the SPE, the buyer solicited input from 
the supplier about its view of what ratings or narrative justifications should be in the 
SPE.  In 46 cases, the supplier provided input.  Performance assessors overall 
relied somewhat on the suppliers’ inputs (average rating 4.6 on a 7 point scale from 
“none” to “a lot” of reliance). 
 Assessors reported the number of hours consumed by the buying team 
completing the SPE.  Responses ranged from 0.5 to 100 hours (mean 18.1, SD 
21.7, median 8).  These hours represent transaction costs of relying on suppliers to 
execute part of the agencies’ missions. 
The survey included an open text field for which respondents were invited to 
recommend improvements to the SPE policy.  Figure 3 displays the most common 
issues along with frequencies.  Accuracy, consistency, ambiguous definitions for 
performance criteria and ratings, and questionable utility were the most frequently 
mentioned concerns.  The respondents’ input is largely consistent with the 
hypotheses explored herein, offering further evidence of nomological validity.        
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  Figure 3.  Assessing Officials’ Issues Needing Attention 
Supplier performance management was rarely augmented by information 
technology other than CPARS.  Several assessors reported using a combination of 
Microsoft Excel, email, and customer surveys.  Only seven respondents identified 
the name of a non-CPARS data system used to collect and track supplier 
performance information.  When asked about the use of other supplier 
management systems, most respondents reported “none.”  Out-of-cycle CPARs 
were not common, used by only 20 assessors (15%). Figure 4 shows the different 
methods used to actively manage supplier performance.  “Actively manage” was 
defined as continuous measure performance and periodically communicate the 
buyer’s assessment of performance to the supplier to foster continuous 
improvements throughout the period of performance.  An industry best practice, 
supplier scorecards, was hardly used in the sample.  
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Figure 4.  Performance Management Methods 
Overall, respondents appeared satisfied with the suppliers’ performance 
levels.  A single-item gauge of repurchase intention reported from the CPAR 
showed a mean of 4.38 on a five-point scale.   
Out of 131 contracts reported, 61 (46.5%) experienced turnover of at least 
one assessing official during the performance period.  Of the 61, the average 
turnover per contact was 2.9 times.  Total turnover ranged from 0 to 50 personnel 
over the life of the contract.   
  In the PLS SEM model, linear relationships between the three aspects of 
communication (bi-directionality, formality, and frequency) and perceived accuracy 
were not found.  However, two groups were created for each aspect of 
communication – those with low and high communication formality, low and high 
communication frequency, and low and high communication bi-directionality.  There 
were 96, 91 and 27 cases in these groups with high values, respectively.  The cut 
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points were scores (1-7) greater than 4, 4, and 4.99, respectively.  Three 
independent samples t-tests showed differences in mean values of perceived 
accuracy between the two groups of communication bi-directionality (t=2.917, 
p<.01) and communication formality (t=3.85, p<.01), suggesting their effects on 
perceived accuracy.  The mean value of summated scale of perceived accuracy 
was 2.78 greater for the high communication bi-directionality group.  Similarly, the 
mean value of summated scale of perceived accuracy was 3.92 greater for the high 
communication formality group.  These differences are consistent with the direction 
of the hypothesized effects (H12 and H13); thus, partial support is found for these 
hypotheses.   
A further investigation of these relationships involved the use of polar 
extremes.  The cases with middle values of communication bi-directionality were 
removed from the sample (summated values of 9-12 of the two-item scale, n=62).  
Perceived accuracy was regressed on polar communication bi-directionality (binary 
coded as high/low) along with leverage attitude, buyer fairness, communication 
formality, and sufficiency of the requirement definition.  The summated scale of 
perceived accuracy was transformed to the fourth power in order to establish 
normality.  The model was significant (F=18.25, p<.001), and communication bi-
directionality (binary) was significant (standardized B=.21, t=2.07, p< .05). 
Together, these three variables accounted for 59% of the variance in perceived 
accuracy.   Similarly, the polar extremes of communication formality were analyzed; 
however, communication formality (binary) was not significant in the model.   
Hypothesis 27 posited a relationship between leverage and SPE accuracy; it 
was supported.  The pilot study survey (and the study survey) measured attitude 
toward using the SPE as leverage, but did not measure actual leverage employed 
on the contract for which data was reported.  The study survey (n=90) included 
additional items to assess actual leverage employed.  Attitude toward leverage and 
actual leverage were both measured with four item scales.  In EFA , both scales’ 
items loaded on two separate latent factors rather than on one, suggesting that the 
two sets of items for each scale had separate meanings.  Reexamining the items 
(L1, L2, L3, and L4), L1 (threaten a low rating) and L2 (use SPE as bargaining 
leverage) seemed to correspond to ex ante threats to get the supplier to do 
something (i.e., proactive leverage).  Conversely, L3 (supplier owes the buyer for 
an inflated rating) and L4 (leverage can be gained from an inflated SPE) seemed to 
correspond to a debt owed by the supplier ex post (i.e., quid pro quo leverage).  For 
the attitude toward leverage construct, the average summated scale for L1 and L2 
was 5.0 (possible value range 2-14), whereas the average summated scale for L3 
and L4 was significantly lower at 3.3 (t=5.72, p<.001).  Similarly, for the actual 
leverage construct, the average summated scale for AL1 and AL2 was 3.5 (possible 
value range 2-14), whereas the average summated scale for AL3 and AL4 was 
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significantly lower at 2.6 (t=3.45, p<.01).  30.5% of the 131 respondents indicated 
an above-neutral attitude toward leverage on at least one of the two scale items.  
Conversely, 7.8% of the 90 respondents in the full study indicated above-neutral 
actual leverage on at least one of the two scale items.  Together, the data confirms 
a difference between an attitude toward leverage (on both proactive leverage and 
quid pro quo leverage) and actual leverage employed with actual leverage being 
significantly more rare (t=5.72, p<.001; t=3.41, p<.01, respectively).  With only 
seven cases indicating actual leverage employed, any effects of this form of 
leverage could not be examined statistically.  The data also confirms that evaluators 
treat proactive leverage and quid pro quo leverage differently with proactive 
leverage being more prevalent.  Note that H27 was tested using the attitude toward 
proactive leverage.  The attitude toward quid pro quo leverage was substituted into 
the PLS SEM model post hoc, and did not significantly affect perceived accuracy.  
However, non-significance is likely due to having too few cases favoring quid pro 
quo leverage (i.e., too little variance).        
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Qualitative Data Analysis 
According to Yin (2009), a qualitative methodology is appropriate when three 
conditions exist: (1) The type of research question is exploratory in nature and 
takes the form of a “why” question, (2) the researcher has no control of the 
behavioral events being researched (i.e., cannot manipulate behaviors then 
measure results as in a controlled experiment), and (3) the focus is on 
contemporary events (p. 8).  The research questions surrounding supplier reactions 
to performance evaluations met all three criteria.     
Data Collection 
The interview protocol (Appendix C) was developed based on a literature 
review surrounding supplier performance evaluation, underlying theories discussed 
in the literature review, and discussions with academic experts and participants 
involved with past performance evaluations and source selections.  In all, eight 
interviews were conducted.  The interviews lasted between 32 and 65 minutes.  
Most interviews were recorded, then transcribed.  Two face-to-face interviews were 
not recorded at the request of the informants.  Transcripts averaged 13.5 pages in 
length.  One interview occurred in-person, five occurred via telephone, and two 
informants provided only written testimony.   
Data Analysis 
The analysis process began by identifying constructs, defining those 
constructs, and then positing relationships between them (Patrick Van Ecke, 2006).  
Each interview was examined to identify themes and then tested to determine 
whether these themes remained consistent in subsequent interviews or in 
reexaminations of previous interviews.   
Sample 
The sample of informants (Table 28) was identified from awarded contracts 
exceeding $150 thousand and from contacts made at a trade association annual 
conference.  Input from representatives of federal contractors who had been directly 
involved in the CPAR evaluation process was sought.  These experts represented 
contractors to defense agencies across four industries.  The perspectives of large 
and small businesses were obtained.  Experience in managing customer 
evaluations ranged from three to 34 years, and there was a similar wide range of 
the number of past performance evaluations experienced (12–50).  Since CPARS 
are used by contractors to gauge customers’ perceived performance levels on 
current contracts and are later used in proposals pursuing new business, the 
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informants included both types of users (i.e., program managers and new business 
developers).   
Table 28.  Informant Demographics 
 
Informant 
 
Business 
Size 
 
Industry 
Experience 
Managing 
Customer 
Evaluations 
(Years) 
 
Duty Title 
 
Supplier Performance 
Experience 
(Number of 
Evaluations) 
1 L Aerospace 34 
Systems 
Engineer 
Multiple 
2 L Aerospace 7 
Program 
Manager 
50 
3 L Aerospace 14 
Program 
Manager 
Multiple 
4 S 
Information 
Technology 
3 COO  
5 L Munitions 4 
VP, 
Business 
Development 
12 
6 L Aerospace 30 
VP, 
Business 
Strategy 
50 
7 L Aerospace Multiple 
Contracts 
Director 
24 
8 S Shipbuilding 30 President 30+ 
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Results - Qualitative 
The results of each research question are discussed in sequential order 
followed by excerpts from interview informants.  The meanings of the excerpts are 
then discussed and related back to the proposed relationships represented in the 
conceptual model (Figure 1).   
 
1. What factors decrease the efficacy of SPEs? 
 
This research question investigates supplier evaluation practices that either:  
(1) hinder a buyer’s efforts to mitigate the risk of adverse selection or (2) that do not 
motivate suppliers to increase performance (i.e., the two purposes of SPEs).  The 
ability to achieve the first purpose using CPAR was called into question by one 
informant, stating: “I have yet to see a competitive procurement that was lost 
because of poor CPARs.”  Yet another informant reported that a CPAR was the 
reason his firm did not win a contract. 
   
One informant mentioned CPARs being reported at the basic contract level 
rather than at the task/delivery order level.  “So far at the task order level, it does 
not appear that they use it.”  The comments highlight the variance in practices 
across government organizations.  First, some do not report CPARs at the task 
order level, only at the basic contract level.  This, of course, will decrease the 
fidelity of the information; it will be more general and less informative.  More general 
information will make the task of future source selection teams more difficult to 
determine the relevancy of the past performance information.  One informant 
commented:  “You couldn’t necessarily tell what [product] line they were talking 
about, so it was just deciphering [inaudible], you know, such a big contract having 
just one CPARS for it.  It wasn’t real clear on what data the comments were, you 
know, within [inaudible] they were addressing.”  Another informant was more 
critical:  “We’ve had IDIQ level CPARS, which, honestly, I think are worthless.  
Because at the [inaudible] level, it’s not really feedback.  I think it’s really for, at 
least from the ones we’ve received, the government is just checking off their box.  
At the IDIQ level, we’ve got every [inaudible], which isn’t that much honestly.  You 
know, the nuts and bolts are when you get to the task order award level.  At the 
task order award level, that’s when the CPARS really matter and you get good 
feedback or bad feedback.”   
 
Second, one informant reported that some organizations do not use past 
performance as an evaluation criterion for task order awards, thereby decreasing 
SPE efficacy.   
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One informant commented on the efficacy of CPARs: “from an overall 
standpoint I think the CPARS are doing what was intended for them to do.”  
 From the findings above emerge the following propositions: 
  
P1:  The specificity of SPEs conducted at a parent contract level will be 
less than that of those conducted at a task order level. 
 
P2:  SPE efficacy will be positively related to SPE specificity. 
2. How do suppliers react to inaccurate SPEs? 
 
As described below in the answer to research question number six, suppliers 
work to correct the record.  They incur significant transaction costs in doing so.  The 
buyer-supplier relationship also appears to suffer.  Most suppliers reacted by 
rebutting the assessment in cases where they believed their rating and/or 
justification was not accurate.  In doing so, several suppliers reported involving 
senior management in the reaction process.  Some suppliers also reported that 
their company has rebutted CPARs whose ratings were negative even when they 
believed the CPARs ratings were warranted.  When asked what would trigger a 
rebuttal, one informant commented: “I guess the criteria of the fairness of the 
feedback and it depends on the rating, right?  If the rating is marginal or anything 
below that.”  Thus, regardless of the truth, some suppliers will take measures to 
preserve their reputation.  One supplier  reacted by blaming the customer for the 
ultimate late delivery of the product.  One informant mentioned that the relationship 
sours.  Then, the supplier retreats to providing the customer only what is in the 
contract – no more.  Of course, in cases in which requirements are ill defined, this 
supplier reaction could result in the buyer receiving less than it truly needs.  One 
supplier reported abandoning a customer permanently.  One supplier reported that 
its company policy is to do little or nothing regardless of what the CPAR says.  It 
should be noted that this supplier operates largely in a non-competitive arena.   
Another informant reported an increase in a willingness to bill for administrative 
hours spent correcting the CPAR.  Thus, some evidence suggests that suppliers 
retaliate or attempt to get even in some way.  Some suppliers also reacted by 
preempting later CPARs processes by providing performance rating input to the 
assessing official prior to the CPAR due date.  Several suppliers reported making a 
concerted effort to understand the customer’s positions, then taking added 
measures to better define the customer’s performance expectations.  This 
sometimes involved refining contract documents.  Then, suppliers reported taking 
measures to ensure those newly-refined expectations will be met in the future.  No 
suppliers in the sample reported filing a claim to formally dispute the CPAR ratings.    
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One informant mentioned increasing documentation: “We will make sure that 
is well documented and [inaudible] that I don’t get dinged on that one in the CPAR.”  
This, absent automation, will increase transaction costs.    
 
One informant alluded to increased transaction costs associated with 
duplicative past performance information submission processes and sources.  The 
informant implied that duplication was necessary due to missing CPARs and 
inaccurate CPARs due to variance across government agency reporting.   
 
“Do they really want us to regurgitate and spit it out?  And so is 
another thing because right now we’re in a time of cost efficiencies 
and in trying to help the government lift them out from a bid and 
proposal process, and when you make me regurgitate this, it is not 
helping to reduce cost because I have got to somehow account for 
all of the B&P money that I spend on RFPs…. which would save 
20 or 30 hours of not having to spend [inaudible] money on.”   
 
Based on the findings above, the following propositions are offered: 
 
P3:    The lower the SPE efficacy, the higher the supplier’s 
 transaction costs. 
 
P4:     The lower the SPE efficacy, the higher the buyer’s 
transaction costs. 
 
P5:     The lower the SPE accuracy, the higher the supplier’s   
 transaction costs. 
 
P6:     The lower the SPE accuracy, the higher the buyer’s 
 transaction costs. 
 
P7:     The lower the SPE accuracy, the lower the relationship 
 quality. 
P8:     The lower the SPE accuracy, the lower the supplier’s 
 investment in transaction specific assets. 
P9:     Competition moderates the relationship between SPE  
 accuracy and seller’s transaction costs such that for 
 suppliers selling primarily in non-competitive markets there 
 will a lesser effect of SPE accuracy on seller’s transaction 
 costs. 
P10:   Competition moderates the relationship between SPE  
 accuracy and buyer’s transaction costs such that for 
 suppliers selling primarily in non-competitive markets there 
 will a lesser effect of SPE accuracy on buyer’s transaction 
 costs. 
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P11:  There will be a positive relationship between a lower-than-
 expected SPE and future communication between the buyer 
 and supplier. 
P12:  There will be a positive relationship between a lower-than-
 expected SPE and future modifications to contractual 
 documents. 
P13:  The lower the SPE accuracy, the higher the functional 
 conflict.  
P14:  The lower the SPE accuracy, the higher the dysfunctional 
 conflict.   
P15:  The lower the SPE accuracy, the higher the probability of a 
 supplier rebuttal. 
P16:  There will be a negative relationship between SPE accuracy 
 and supplier retaliation. 
P17:   Relationship quality moderates the relationship between SPE 
 accuracy and supplier retaliation such that in cases of low 
 relationship quality, SPE accuracy will be negatively related 
 to supplier retaliation (i.e., opportunism).   
P18:   A suppliers premepting of SPE evaluations (i.e., early 
 communication) will be negatively related to the supplier’s 
 SPE rating expectation gap. 
P19:   SPE accuracy will be positively related to SPE efficacy. 
P20:   A SPE that is lower-than-expected will be positively 
 associated with supplier reputation preservation activities 
 (rebuttal, blame the buyer, and negotiating ratings). 
3. Do SPEs, in general, motivate suppliers to increase performance? 
 
The responses to this question were mixed.  One informant qualified the 
effect contingent on the proper use of the evaluation system as follows:  
“Fundamentally yes, if the system is followed and government employees have 
good education on the use of the system.”  One informant clearly backed the 
relationship between SPEs and performance, stating:  “I think there is no doubt the 
secondary purpose [improved performance] is by far what I think it’s most accurate 
or is doing the best.  It is definitely motivating us.  It is a metric that we are focused 
on.  We look at it monthly across all of our contracts, we get down to—yes, they 
come out annually, but over our portfolio with these 50, we are looking at just as 
soon as the scores come out where those are…we are definitely motivated to not 
have any yellows or reds and we are definitely trying to be proactive in that by doing 
the self-assessments and not just doing them at the end of the period to help 
increase the score, but to try to do them at least semiannually so we have a 
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snapshot of where we are and if there are issues, trying to bring them up early 
enough that we can try to resolve them by the end of the period.” 
 
However, three informants reported no effect on their level of effort; they 
strive for excellence regardless.  When asked whether performance evaluations 
motivate a change in performance levels, one informant commented:  “As a major 
business the answer is no. We strive to do better because it is good business. The 
CPARs are important to us only because they are important to the customer.”  
Another commented:  “The CPAR system is written at the end of the period 
performance.  Thus all of my performance that mattered is behind me—its past 
history.  The only changes I can make are in the future.  As a contractor we set 
goals every year for customer performance and most every year we exceed them.  
We are very conscientious to provide our customer with great service, product and 
performance.”  Another informant stated: “I’m motivated to do a good job regardless 
even if there was a CPAR or not.”  Another informant that operated in a less 
competitive industry was more critical, stating: “I don’t think the past performance 
reports provide any value added for the customer.”   
 
One informant made the association between CPARs and performance effort 
quite clear, stating: “So we give great attention to CPAR elements that have yellow 
or red elements to correct those and to actively try to keep from getting those 
scores through better communication.”    
 
P21 :  There is a positive relationship between SPE use and supplier 
 performance. 
  
4. How does the accuracy of SPEs affect relationship quality? 
 
The relationship between the buyer and supplier arose throughout many of 
the informants’ responses to many questions.  When asked whether the informant 
suspected that the government ever uses the PP rating/evaluation as leverage, one 
informant answered: “Yes, especially if they don’t get along with the contractor’s 
managers.”  Another informant stated: “Absolutely, we have a client who we are 
helping now, because the government client is using this to reduce the requests for 
equitable adjustment.”  A third informant commented:  “that the CPARS is used to 
change our position when we negotiate issues and when tough positions are 
brought to the forefront.  “Well, you know, you only got this on your CPARS, 
therefore, you need to work harder so you should give us the—.”  So you are told to 
negotiate.”  “I think it’s used as leverage every time we go to negotiate.”  “It’s 
implied.  It’s just hideous.  It’s under the surface.”  This informant further 
commented:  “It’s a bad marriage.”  Another commented: “Yeah, I’d say leverage, 
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because I guess I don’t know exactly what gets them, but they definitely use them 
as an opportunity to express their displeasure.”  One informant put it this way:  
“Some government program officers use the CPAR as a means to maybe get our 
attention or to get maybe a separate agenda, at least on the draft if not on the final 
version.”  When asked whether the government uses CPARs as leverage or a 
threat, one informant commented: “Oh certain—you know where we might have 
some thoughts that way, I don’t know that it is seen as an overall trend.  There are 
probably elements to it in some cases, but to me it is the exception.  It is certainly 
not the rule.”  One informant alluded to using the CPAR as punishment:  
“Customers are inconsistent.  They are consistent when they want to fillet you.”  Yet 
another informant commented that when compared to customer evaluations from 
other businesses (e.g., from prime contractors when acting as a subcontractor), the 
prime’s SPE is more fair, more open, more forthright, less structured, and the 
relationships are stronger.  This comment suggests that sometimes the 
government’s CPARs may not be entirely forthright. 
   
One informant reported that his company will no longer do business with a 
particular government organization due to misplaced blame on the contractor for 
repair delays; thus, in this case, the relationship was ruined.  Another informant 
commented: “We as the Contractor are highly agitated.  The relationship is 
strained.”  “Trust deteriorates.”  Another stated: “Well there is no doubt there is a 
strained relationship when the customer puts out a CPAR that surprises us with a 
negative.” 
 
P22:   SPE use increases buyer’s bargaining leverage (i.e., coersive 
 power) for the buyer.  
P23:  The greater the buyer’s use of the SPE as bargaining leverage 
 (coersive power), the lower the relationship quality. 
 
5. Why are SPEs often inaccurate? 
 
Many factors were identified to affect the accuracy of SPEs.  One informant 
identified biases commonly mentioned in employee performance appraisal literature 
– recency and an emphasis on the negative. “The natural inclination is that even 
though it to be over the 12 month period, they think about what has happened to 
them recently and they tend to think about the bad things more than the good 
things.”  Another informant reinforced this position, stating: “Sometimes the report 
reflected some recent event rather than the entire period.”  The bias from the most 
recent performance was corroborated by comments from the Council Of Defense 
And Space Industry Associations.  “CPARS assessments often contain outdated 
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information or are focused on the “issue du-jour” at the expense of underlying trend 
or longer term performance assessments. (2013, pg. 5)” Another informant implied 
that the government’s CPARs are inflated, stating: “several primes have their own 
rating system for suppliers. My perception is that they tend to give lower scores.”   
All informants mentioned inconsistency and subjectivity in the CPAR 
evaluations.  One informant commented:  “Inconsistency given by the human 
judgment factor.  There is too much subjectivity.”  “It makes reports unreliable.”  
Another informant stated that the CPAR was not fair due to too much subjectivity, 
and reported experiencing inconsistent definitions of the ratings across CPARs.  
Another informant commented: “In our experience [the agency] does not follow and 
blatantly violates published guidelines for filling these out and uses subjectivity to 
cover up for its own mistakes during project execution.”  One informant commented 
how the customer can be internally inconsistent:  “When a quarterly review with the 
customer comes back four quarters in a row with an exceptional /very good write up 
its very hard to accept a satisfactory at the end of the performance period.”  Another 
informant commented:  “With the CPARS, I know there’s supposed to be some 
guidelines on, you know, what’s acceptable or marginal, or whatever the guidelines 
are for performance, but it seems to be not really strictly enforced as far as like 
there’s more motion on the ratings of the CPARS with not a lot of justification.”  This 
comment suggests that inconsistency is attributed to the individual evaluator 
conducting the evaluation:  “We’ve had some difficult people leave, so we had 
some new people come in and things got a lot better and then we’ve had it go the 
other way.”  One informant stated: “There are some shortfalls in it, it is definitely 
subjective.  In other words, most especially between different customers - meaning 
that we have contracts with various contracting agencies across the government.  
Some are a lot harder raters than others.”  Another informant commented:  “Now 
above that when you are talking about satisfactory to very good and exceptional 
performance, much more subjective, much less of a leg to stand on.”  He went on to 
say: 
“there is a big difference between the way different commands 
evaluate or score CPARS.  I have got one that consistently if you 
are basically doing the job it is satisfactory, you are green.  They 
might give a few very goods.  It really takes something strong to 
get a very good.  I have never seen an exceptional from them.  
Other ones very goods are the norm and the exceptional are not 
uncommon and very goods you have to be basically doing some 
things wrong—again it is not to a marginal category, but that is 
where it gets very subjective.  If you miss a [data deliverable] or 
two, well what does that mean?  Does that mean that you are 
yellow because you missed some?  Well it shouldn’t because how 
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important were those and what was the circumstances and such?  
Then that is just depending on who is making the judgment how 
[can] we score.”   
 
Another informant corroborated the problem. 
 
“I see the difference are in the relative ranking, in other words, a 
program that has all greens and three purples can be just as good 
as a program that has exceptionals with a couple of very goods, 
but they are judged from different contracting offices and one puts 
real high standards on what scores—what it takes to be 
considered above satisfactory and the other kind of lets loose as 
far as how people judge things.” 
 
Timeliness of CPAR reporting was identified as a concern:  One informant 
commented, “We have had reports over a year late.” Another reported: “the 
contractual period of performance ended 31 December.  I just received the CPAR 
from the CPAR system 11 April.  The previous period of performance machinations 
lasted until June.  6 months after the end of the period.”   
Timeliness of performance feedback in general also seems to be a culprit.  
When asked whether the government uses CPARs to actively manage contractor 
performance, one informant commented: “Don’t think they do.”  A strong consensus 
was that CPARs are not used to manage contractor performance on an ongoing 
basis.  One informant commented: “It is more—it is easier to commonly hear them, 
like “Oh, CPARS again.”  Again, you know, just with appraisals, “Oh, appraisal time 
again.”  Yeah, they don’t look forward to it and so I think for them it is not a priority, 
it is not a means of measuring.”  Another informant stated: “There is not a whole of 
other performance feedbacks throughout the year.”  One informant stated: “can’t 
very well do a better job if you aren’t informed until the end of the year.” Another 
informant alluded to the importance of time stating: “We have been more proactive 
with our performance evaluation discussions with the client through the 
performance itself, so we don’t get blind [sided] like the one bad experience we 
had.”  One informant stated: “when we had more award fee contracts, we got more, 
you know, verbal feedback or specific feedback.  Once we went to incentive fee 
contracts, we don’t get that.  I would rather, you know, more times through the 
years, someone at the [customer] gets some comments as to contractor 
performance rather than waiting until the CPARS.”  One informant commented on 
the value of more frequent feedback intervals: “I have got one contract for sure that 
there is a monthly scorecard.  It is the—the government gives us a monthly look at 
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how we are doing and it basically very much you can tie it right to the CPAR.  There 
is no fuzz on how things are going throughout the year.  So that is great.”   
Poorly defined requirements and differences in expectations were identified 
as weaknesses that affect the accuracy of SPEs.  One informant stated: 
“Absolutely. It is difficult to meet an “unknown” requirement.”  Another informant 
mentioned a lack of agreement (i.e., not in the contract) on performance levels, 
stating: “And if you say you want a [inaudible] cap level of a certain point, yeah, we 
can make that, but you have to agree that that’s what our threshold is going to be.”  
“Sometimes it is [in the contract], but they’ve gotten rid of our incentive fee, so when 
we don’t have an incentive fee threshold and you don’t write it into a contract or a 
performance work statement, we’re kind of shooting in the dark.”  “Just tell us what 
it takes—what you expect.  If we want to get an exceptional, what do you expect us 
to provide to you?  What performance?”  This statement underscores frustration 
with the ambiguity in what performance level is required to attain above-satisfactory 
ratings.  Some informants mentioned buyer-side expectations that were not 
captured in the contract: “they’re trying to hold us accountable for things that aren’t 
even in the contract.”  “What they wanted and what they bought were two different 
things.  And so I’m getting dinged on things that again I shouldn’t be dinged on.  It 
was not in my contract to provide that level of service for talent.”  One informant 
raised the issue of using the wrong contract type, how that affected differences of 
expectations of performance, and ultimately affected the resultant CPAR. 
“a customer needed a replacement part and it was obsolete.  We 
needed to redesign another replacement and the—from the 
customer standpoint it seemed pretty simple.  “Hey, this part is no 
longer being made, we can no longer get it.  [Contractor], we need 
to you create a new one.  Can you get it for us?”  It is not that 
simple.  In other words, trying to resurrect what went into this 
design of some piece that is 20 or more years old and work with 
the subcontractor who is maybe turned over the ownership of the 
company a couple of times and such, that there is no doubt that it 
is [the contractor’s] need to fix it, but just a recognition on both 
sides about too simplistic on what the fix would be, that we 
realized that it is a much harder job.  Now that—yes, [the 
contractor] is on the hook to do it, but it had to do from both sides 
they just didn’t realize what the real requirements were up front or 
what was all going to be needed to be done.  It goes to the idea of 
not accepting fixed price developmental contracts.  Basically trying 
to hold our feet to a fixed price contract on the developmental side 
when that is definitely the wrong contract vehicle to do it under.” 
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Evaluator turnover also surfaced as a contributing factor.  When asked 
whether turnover affects past performance evaluations, one informant commented: 
“Very much so. New players may not be aware of particular circumstances leading 
to performance issues. Or like in one of our well established programs, the PCO 
changed after 10 years. And since the program was always on time and within 
budget our CPARs were rated mostly excellent (4’s and 5’s) but the new PCO said 
she never gave better than 3. So to an independent reviewer our performance 
looked as if it went down when in fact it was the same.”  Another informant 
commented: “on my current contract, I’m on the third PCO since I took the job over 
about a year ago.”   
One informant commented, “There are a few cases where it just seemed like 
somebody had an agenda.  Those never go over well.”  Another informant 
corroborated the existence of an agenda stating: “[The evaluator] distorted the 
evaluation to suit his/her own agenda.”  These testimonies suggests that CPARs 
are sometimes used to attain some purpose other than to provide the supplier 
honest, accurate performance feedback.  A third informant commented: “The CPAR 
process from the Contractor side can be brutal. The Government personnel can 
abuse the system and mete out punishment with little to no recourse.  The 
Contractor always appears to be in the wrong as they are replying to accusations.”     
One informant identified inadequate training as a culprit.  “See major 
weaknesses in the training government employees receive on criteria to use in 
filling these out. This has cost us tens of millions of dollars in business on future 
bids.”    
One informant aluded to a lack of due diligence on behalf of the customer, 
stating:  “Lack of knowledge on the Customer side.   I have been evaluated for 
performance outside the period of performance.  Additionally, I have been 
evaluated by Government employees who do not research their comments before 
entering them into the CPAR system.   The Government has continued to ignore 
contract language to down grade our performance rating.” Another informant 
commented:  
 
“It depends on the COR.  Some are very thorough and some are 
not and especially the one that wasn’t was the one I had the issue 
with and then went back for verification.  “I am not understanding,” 
or, “you’re interpreting it one way and they are interpreting it a 
different way.”  So, yes, it differs.  Then you have some you can 
tell—again just like performance reviews, you can tell when the 
COR actually took his or her time to do it and then you can tell—I 
have had ones where you can tell that they literally took five 
minutes to do it and [inaudible] last minute.” 
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Some informants identified a lack of justification for the assigned ratings.  
“The justification for ratings received have been weak to minimal on the 
Government’s part.”   
One informant identified the function of the evaluator as a factor.  “the closer 
you are to the product, you know, the less disagreement we have.”  The informant 
was aluding to more disagreement with contracting personnel than with program 
managers and engineers with whom they interact more often.    
The following exchange serves as quite a vivid example of the failure of 
communication as a contributing factor to inaccurate SPEs.  
  
“I’ve had three different task orders that have been awarded to us 
under this IDIQ and two of them because, you know, money can 
be [inaudible] in these interagencies that can use big large idea 
vehicle.  For the [X] contract, two of my [inaudible] do come from 
[X], but one actually comes from [Y] and so it’s interesting seeing 
how the different agencies handle it even under the one umbrella 
permit.  So I would say the [X] guys are very much more work with 
the contractor in the sense of at the end of the day there’s no 
surprises in my CPAR.  You know, at the point I address it, we’ve 
had open communications along the way, there’s a lot of back and 
forth in them considering my input, and that’s worked well.  On the 
other side, on the [Y] side, so as I mentioned, it could be in their 
policy, it could be their environment or training, but I was honestly 
pretty surprised by the CPAR that I got and I could literally go in 
and justify it all the way to the issue that I [inaudible] down in the 
evaluation, but it wasn’t until the end, you know.  I sent a CPAR, 
then they put it in, and I have some, you know, so long to respond, 
and then I made my response.  The COR didn’t agree, so it went 
up to a higher up in the [Y] and then the actual higher up person in 
[Y] went back and actually cited some certain things that were out 
of the contractual plans.  One was we got dinged on key or COR 
personnel with no key or COR personnel requirement in my 
contract, so I had something to say about that.  I’m not sure why 
I’m being rated on this when there are no COR or key personnel 
requirement in the contract or in its deliverable.  Obviously, I 
decided it was in my favor to remove that.  It was almost afraid to 
talk to me.  You know, it was like they were afraid of the contract or 
afraid of what they can or cannot say, so it was very different from 
my other experiences.  Now, [that was] like in our base period the 
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first year and now this time it’s funny when he delivered one, he’s 
like, “Yeah, we’ve got this CPAR to do again.”  He’s like, “I’ve been 
told I can actually get your input.” 
 
This supplier also identified a lack of training of assessing officials: “I think in 
the CPAR process the greatest weakness would probably be training for the COR 
or COTR.”   
One informant reported engaging and appealing to a higher-level authority in 
the buying agency to rectify an inaccurate report.    
One informant mentioned that past government errors or failures that were 
erroneously attributed to the contractor – discovered after the close of the CPARs – 
never get reflected in the CPAR retroactively.  The report, as it was, remains 
inaccurate in the system.    
 
P24:   Suppliers’ reputation preservation efforts will be positively 
 related to SPE rating inflation (i.e., negatively related to 
 accuracy). 
 
P25:   Inconsistency of rating definitions will be negatively associated 
 with SPE accuracy. 
 
P26:   Subjectivity of SPEs will be negatively associated with SPE  
 accuracy. 
 
P27:   Feedback frequency moderates the relationship between 
 inconsistency and SPE accuracy such that more frequent 
 performance feedback decreases the magnitude of the negative 
 relationship between inconsistency and SPE accuracy. 
 
P28:   Feedback frequency moderates the relationship between 
 subjectivity and SPE accuracy such that more frequent 
 performance feedback decreases the magnitude of the negative 
 relationship between subjectivity and SPE accuracy. 
 
P29:   Performance feedback frequency will be positively related to SPE 
 accuracy. 
 
P30:   The sufficiency of the requirement definition will be positively  
 related to SPE accuracy. 
   
P31:   The greater the assessor turnover, the lower the SPE accuracy. 
 
P32:   There will be a positive relationship between the assessor’s level 
 of effort and SPE accuracy.  
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P33:   Assessors serving in functional capacities with less knowledge 
 of the technical aspects of supplier performance will generate 
 less accurate SPEs. 
  
P34:   Assessor training on SPEs will be positively related to SPE 
 accuracy. 
 
P35:   Assessor level of effort will be positively related to SPE 
 specificity. 
 
Together, the aforementioned propositions are displayed in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Consequences of SPE Efficacy (Supplier
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6. How many man-hours do suppliers invest in responding to SPEs? 
 
Across the eight respondents, reported man-hours varied widely.  Some 
informants indicated that the time depended on whether their firm agreed with the 
CPAR evaluation or whether the evaluation was positive or negative.  If positive, 
man-hours were minimal (one estimate provided was two man-hours).  If, however, 
there was disagreement (or negative), man-hours consumed to respond to the 
government buyer ranged from 15-800 (average 202, median 80).  One informant 
attributed the extra effort to “all of the management involved.”  Another informant 
commented:  “And as you look at over like the 20 IPTs I go to, it takes 10 or 15 man 
hours and it starts to add up.  It’s not efficient for them or us.”  “A lot of these are 
billable hours.”  “I think that it does cost each one too much money for something 
that should not be this hard to do.”  “I think that because it has become so huge, 
they’d say, 'Yeah, we’re going to just go ahead and bill because it takes us so much 
effort to do this that we might not have otherwise.”  “It’s not effective for the person 
who has to go out and fly the aircraft or the person who has to maintain the aircraft.  
It does them no good.  We spend dollars on unimportant administrative paperwork.” 
 
7.  What communication tactics do suppliers use to manage the SPE 
process? 
 
Tactics used by suppliers to manage the SPE process varied from no 
attempt to manage the process to very deliberate efforts.  One informant reported 
providing quarterly inputs of performance to the government customer coupled by 
quarterly reviews by the customer.  This contractor also provides the customer a 
draft CPAR report prior to the end of the period of performance.  “We decided that 
[draft reports] gave better feedback and that if there was an issue, we could adjust it 
during the year, which has been suggested by our company that that would be a 
good way to go it and it would stem off issues long before the end of the year.”  The 
contractor cautioned, however, that the draft report has been met with some 
resistance by the customer, who perceived that the contractor was trying to tell the 
customer how to do their evaluation.  Another contractor also preempts the official 
CPAR with a draft self-assessment provided to the government six months in 
advance of the due date for the official CPAR.  This contractor commented: “It gives 
us a much better leg to stand on and a much better negotiating position to utilize the 
self-assessment.”  The self-assessment approach seemed to pay off.  “I really think 
since we started the self-assessment process that the number of CPARS that we 
need to rebut is much smaller.  I think maybe it used to be 10% and now it is down 
to 5%.”  Another informant tries to preempt the CPAR informally, for example at the 
end of a meeting such as a critical design review. 
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The informant using the self-assessments also mentioned that it is helpful to, 
on a large program with many layers of management, ensure that the self-
assessment is coordinated with all of the customer’s functional performance 
assessors at the lowest level.  “So I mean the lesson learned that way, we need to 
get those self-assessments down to the focal level.”   
One contractor commented:  “There is not a whole of other [than CPAR] 
performance feedbacks throughout the year.”  One informant reported providing 
“just constant, constant communication…keeping [the customer] aware,” after being 
surprised by a less-than-favorable CPAR.  A common thread in responses 
pertained to increased communication and more frequent communication.   
Another informant mentioned using self-praise to call the buyer’s attention to 
things done well: “You know, giving them updates of even when I think something is 
trivial [inaudible], you know, the kudos, you know, patting yourself on the backside.”   
Interestingly, when asked whether the CPAR process and/or rating 
definitions were discussed at the post-award orientation, one informant commented: 
“No, never.”  No other informant mentioned CPARs as part of the post-award 
orientation agenda.   
One informant mentioned increasing documentation: “We will make sure that 
is well documented and [inaudible] that I don’t get dinged on that on in the CPAR.”   
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Discussion 
Substantial transaction costs are dedicated to avoid adverse selection - the 
risk of selecting an incapable supplier that otherwise misrepresents itself as 
capable.  Following contract formation, more transaction costs are incurred to 
monitor supplier performance to thwart supplier opportunism ex post.  The 
effectiveness of a mechanism to monitor and record supplier performance 
information, a supplier performance evaluation, was the topic of this study. 
There are many concerns that the SPEs/ratings are not properly, timely, or 
accurately completed.  Unreliable or inaccurate past performance assessments can 
harm suppliers’ reputations and can bias source selections, resulting in adverse 
selection.  If past performance information is not reliable, and if evaluators don’t use 
it in discriminating between competitive proposals, the effort of collecting and 
reporting the past performance information is squandered.  Likewise, the effort of 
evaluating and documenting inaccurate past performance information during source 
selections would be wasted.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that buying 
organizations often do not use past performance information as a meaningful 
discriminator between proposals.     
The purpose of the research, therefore, was to explore the antecedents to 
and consequences of the efficacy of SPEs. The intent was to diagnose alleged 
weaknesses and to explore potential improvements. The following research 
questions were addressed:   
1. What factors decrease the efficacy of SPEs? 
2. How do suppliers react to inaccurate SPEs? 
3. Do SPEs, in general, motivate suppliers to increase performance? 
4. How does the accuracy of SPEs affect relationship quality?  
5. Why are SPEs often inaccurate? 
6. How many man-hours do suppliers invest in responding to SPEs? 
7. What communication tactics do suppliers use to manage the SPE 
process? 
 
8. To what extent does inter-rater disagreement (i.e., dissonance) affect 
SPE efficacy?   
This research combined quantitative and qualitative methodologies to 
examine these research questions.  From a literature review, a conceptual model of 
27 hypotheses was developed to explore antecedents to SPE efficacy. A survey 
was deployed, and data was collected from 131 respondents. The model was 
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analyzed using PLS SEM to estimate relationships. To explore the consequences of 
SPE efficacy on suppliers, a qualitative approach was employed. Eight subject 
matter experts representing suppliers were interviewed to explore how well SPEs 
achieve the intended goals of: (1) motivating supplier performance and (2) 
decreasing the risk of adverse selection in the future. The data analysis resulted in 
the development of 35 testable propositions that should yield insight into the 
phenomenon from the supplier side of the dyad.    
1.  What factors decrease the efficacy of SPEs? 
While most respondents agreed that SPEs are effective, an appreciable 
number - nearly a third - challenged the effectiveness of SPEs.  Figure 6 depicts the 
series of relationships that explain SPE efficacy.  From the survey of buyers, SPE 
efficacy was deteriorated directly by rating dissonance and by poor rating 
justifications.  Additionally, some evidence suggests that low SPE efficacy is 
associated with inflated ratings. The effect size of rating justification on SPE efficacy 
is more than twice that of rating dissonance.  Therefore, buying organizations 
needing to improve SPE efficacy should first seek means to improve rating 
justifications.  Insights as to how to do so follow.  
Perceived usefulness of the SPE process and supporting information 
technology tools and the perceived accuracy of SPEs affect how sufficiently SPE 
ratings are justified.  Thus, performance evaluators with little faith in the SPE 
process(es) and tool(s) may not invest the requisite time and effort to justify their 
ratings.  Hence, it appears that in a manual SPE schemes that depend largely on 
human effort and discretion, evaluators must believe in the SPE scheme’s efficacy; 
otherwise, rating justifications will suffer.  Perceived accuracy has a far greater 
effect on rating justification than does perceived usefulness.  Role overload also 
decreases rating justifications.  Further, perceived accuracy also affects perceived 
usefulness.  Examining the effects on perceived accuracy, the sufficiency of the 
requirement definition has the greatest impact, followed closely by buyer fairness.  
Leverage attitude slightly decreases perceived accuracy, while communication bi -
directionality and communication formality increase accuracy.  Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the perceived accuracy of SPEs does not improve with 
increased surveillance of the supplier.  Some evidence also suggests that accuracy 
is affected by inflated ratings.   
Rating dissonance is increased by fear of supplier dispute and by evaluator 
role overload.  Fear of supplier dispute increases rating inflation, and is decreased 
by relationship quality.  Relationship quality is degraded by evaluator turnover and 
enhanced by communication bi-directionality and communication formality.   
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 Rating dissonance was not affected directly by perceived accuracy.  
However, an indirect effect of perceived accuracy through fear of supplier dispute 
exists.  Thus, lower accuracy increases fear of supplier dispute, which, in turn, 
increases rating dissonance.  Some evidence suggests an association between 
rating dissonance and rating inflation.  Rating dissonance is also increased by 
excessive amounts of workload (i.e., role overload).  Evidence suggests that the 
SPEs examined in the sample were manual processes of information collecting, 
synthesizing, deliberating, and reporting supplier performance.  Greater perceived 
accuracy in SPEs resulted in more time to complete the SPEs.  Since the SPEs 
examined in the sample were largely manual processes, over-work situations can 
result in evaluators sub-optimizing tasks that are perceived as less critical or tasks 
in which a minimalist approach can go undetected (perhaps tasks such as SPEs).      
SPE efficacy was most affected by the extent to which ratings were justified, 
documented, explained, and understandable.  While SPE efficacy was not affected 
directly by perceived accuracy, there was an indirect effect through the effect of 
perceived accuracy on rating justification.  Thus, SPEs that are less accurate do not 
sufficiently justify the ratings.  Additionally, post hoc tests unveiled another potential 
culprit to poor justifications – poor rating definitions.  In turn, both stakeholders  of 
SPEs are affected.  Future buyers are affected during source selection by struggling 
to understand the ratings and how to evaluate them.  Suppliers are also affected.  It 
may be that in order for suppliers to allocate more resources and effort into attaining 
higher levels of performance, they have to believe the ratings.  Thorough rating 
justifications may help them to buy in, while poor justifications may spawn no action.   
Lower SPE efficacy also appears to be associated with inflated ratings.  
Suppliers suggested that the level at which SPEs are reported affects the efficacy.  
SPEs completed at a parent contract level (e.g., IDIQ) versus a task-order level are 
not effective; they are not specific enough for future source selection teams to 
discern relevancy or to glean insights on performance. 
Some buyer-side hypothesis testing conflicted with supplier-side 
propositions.  For example, suppliers’ experiences suggested the existence of 
relationships between assessor turnover and SPE accuracy.  However, the data 
collected from assessors did not support this hypothesis.  These results could be 
attributed to the source of the data; thus, more research is needed that combines 
data from the buyer and supplier of the same transaction.  The results also suggest 
that there may be gaps in perceptions of accuracy between buyers and suppliers.  
Suppliers contested SPEs 25 times challenging 45 ratings.   
It appears that suppliers commit a significantly greater amount of time 
reacting to SPEs (mean 202 hours) than buyers do preparing them (mean 18.1 
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hours).  However, additional research based on a larger sample is needed to 
confirm the suppliers’ estimates. 
 Some evaluators adopt an attitude that using SPEs as leverage is legitimate 
practice.  This leverage attitude is associated with lower SPE accuracy.  Attitudes 
toward leverage were higher than actual leverage employed.  Testimony from 
suppliers confirmed that evaluators sometimes use SPEs to exercise coercive 
power.  This research also unveiled a distinction between proactive leverage 
(getting a supplier to do something) and quid pro quo leverage (receiving payback 
for an inflated rating), with the former being more common.
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Figure 6.  Antecedents of SPE Efficacy
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2. How do suppliers react to inaccurate SPEs? 
 
When receiving a SPE thought to be inaccurate, suppliers work to correct the 
record.  They incur significant transaction costs in doing so. SPEs thought to be 
inaccurate lead to functional and dysfunctional conflict. Functional conflict 
encompasses the parties working together to understand the ratings, the rationales, 
and corrective actions (perhaps on both sides of the dyad). Several suppliers 
reported making a concerted effort to understand the customer’s positions, then 
taking added measures to better define the customer’s performance expectations.  
Then, suppliers reported taking measures to ensure those newly refined 
expectations will be met in the future. Dysfunction conflict manifests in destructive 
actions such as blame, dispute, or retaliation. The buyer-supplier relationship also 
appears to suffer with inaccurate SPEs. Most suppliers reacted by rebutting the 
assessment in cases where they believed their rating and/or justification was not 
accurate. In doing so, several suppliers reported involving senior management in 
the reaction process. Some suppliers also reported that their company has rebutted 
CPARs whose ratings were negative even when they believed the CPARs ratings 
were warranted. Thus, regardless of the truth, some suppliers will take measures to 
preserve their reputation. In addition to accuracy, suppliers suggested that the gap 
between the expected and actual rating is key. Hence, even positive ratings (e.g., 
“acceptable” or “good”) may be unwelcome and, thus, disputed. One supplier 
reported abandoning a customer permanently. Suppliers also mentioned an 
unwillingness to go “above and beyond” for a customer following an inaccurate 
SPE; they will revert to providing the bare minimum stated in the four corners of the 
contract. At face value, this might be dismissed by some buyers; however, 
considering that many requirements are ill-defined (Hawkins et al., 2015) and that 
complex contracts are always incomplete (Williamson, 2005), depending solely on 
the contract may be detrimental to the buyer. Another informant reported an 
increase in a willingness to bill for administrative hours spent correcting the CPAR.  
Thus, some evidence suggests that suppliers retaliate or attempt to get even in 
some way. Some suppliers also reacted by preempting later CPARs processes by 
providing performance rating input to the assessing official prior to the CPAR due 
date. One informant mentioned increasing documentation will increase transaction 
costs.    
Suppliers raised two particular consequences of SPE efficacy – buyer and 
seller transaction costs.  Rather than focus on SPE efficacy – a buyer-centric 
concern, suppliers discussed SPE accuracy.  They described several deleterious 
effects on the supplier of low accuracy, and discussed sources of inaccuracy. Their 
testimonies are largely consistent with the findings from the buyer-side survey data 
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that rating dissonance likely traces back to inconsistent interpretations of ratings 
and performance criteria coupled with subjectivity. 
3.  Do SPEs, in general, motivate suppliers to increase performance? 
The responses to this question were mixed; however, evidence suggests 
that SPEs can be an effective motivator. One informant qualified the effect 
contingent on the buyer’s proper use of the evaluation processes. One informant 
clearly backed the relationship between SPEs and an attempt at attaining higher 
performance. However, three informants reported no effect on their level of effort; 
they strive for excellence regardless. One informant attempted to increase 
performance to the extent that they could avoid receiving marginal or unacceptable 
ratings. Thus, further research is needed to understand the conditions in which 
SPEs do not motivate higher performance.   
4.  How does the accuracy of SPEs affect relationship quality? 
One supplier informant reported that his company will no longer do business 
with a particular government organization due to misplaced blame on the contractor 
for repair delays; thus, in this case, the relationship was ruined. Another informant 
identified a strained relationship with deteriorated trust. While the supplier side of 
the dyad is the most appropriate perspective to take in determining the effect of 
SPE accuracy on relationship quality, buyer-side data corroborates a positive direct 
effect. Relationship quality in this data omitted commitment; it encompassed only 
trust and satisfaction.    
5.  Why are SPEs often inaccurate? 
Accuracy of SPEs is critical because it decreases supplier rebuttals and, 
indirectly, increases SPE efficacy.  Several factors affect perceived accuracy.  From 
the buyer survey data, an insufficiently defined requirement has the greatest impact 
on accuracy.  Suppliers corroborated that poorly defined requirements and 
differences in expectations were identified as weaknesses that affect the accuracy 
of SPEs.   Therefore, buyers and suppliers should work to better define 
requirements and how fulfillment of those requirements will be verified.  These 
details should be sufficiently explicated in the solicitation and contract documents.  
Unfairness by the buyer also decreases accuracy.  Hence, the closer the SPE 
resembles what the evaluator discerns the supplier deserved (i.e., earned), the 
greater the perceived accuracy.  If the SPE deviates from that deserved – positively 
or negatively, accuracy decreases.  Thus, evaluators should record SPEs that 
reflect only what the supplier earned.  Hence, sources of distortion (see Figure 2) 
should be purged.  Explicit policy and process automation could be helpful in this 
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regard.  Leverage attitude slightly decreases perceived accuracy.  Suppliers 
corroborated the effect of leverage, reporting a hidden agenda in some SPEs.  
Some evidence suggests that a lack of communication formality and 
communication bi-directionality degrade accuracy.  Thus, process and policy 
changes and any augmenting information technology should facilitate formal and 
two-way communication.  Evidence from suppliers (and qualitatively from some 
buyers) suggests that infrequent performance evaluations decrease accuracy.  
However, general communication frequency did not affect accuracy in the sample.  
An automated supplier management information technology system could facilitate 
more frequent SPEs.  Both the quantitative evidence from buyers and qualitative 
testimony from suppliers suggest that inflated ratings are associated with lower 
perceived accuracy.  Thus, mechanisms to thwart rating inflation should be 
explored, such as instilling means to reduce subjectivity in evaluations.  Suppliers 
identified biases commonly mentioned in employee performance appraisal literature 
– recency and an emphasis on the negative.  Suppliers also mentioned 
inconsistency and subjectivity in the CPAR evaluations as the greatest contributors 
to inaccuracy.   Although not supported by the buyer data, suppliers identified 
evaluator turnover and technical knowledge as factors that decrease accuracy.  
Suppliers also mentioned that a lack of training of evaluators on how to conduct a 
SPE was a factor.   
6.  How many man-hours do suppliers invest in responding to SPEs? 
Across the eight respondents, man-hours varied widely.  Some informants 
indicated that the time depended on whether their firm agreed with the CPAR 
evaluation or whether the evaluation was positive or negative.  If positive, man-
hours were minimal.  If, however, there was disagreement (or negative), man-hours 
consumed to respond to the government buyer ranged from 15-800 (average 202, 
median 80).  These hours constitute significant transaction costs.  Nonetheless, the 
magnitude across all rated contracts that are contested is unknown.  Future 
research could seek to quantify the transaction costs from a representative sample.  
Given the suppliers’ testimonies, greater accuracy of SPEs should result in fewer 
disagreements and rebuttals, which should, in turn, reduce transaction costs.    
7.  What communication tactics do suppliers use to manage the SPE process? 
Tactics used by suppliers to manage the SPE process varied from no 
attempt to manage the process to very deliberate efforts.  One informant reported 
providing quarterly inputs of performance to the government customer coupled by 
quarterly reviews by the customer.  This contractor also provides the customer a 
draft SPE report prior to the end of the period of performance.  One informant 
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mentioned that it is helpful to, on a large program with many layers of management, 
ensure that the self-assessment is coordinated with all of the customer’s functional 
performance assessors at the lowest level.  A common thread in responses 
pertained to increased communication and more frequent communication.  No 
informants mentioned SPEs as part of the post-award orientation agenda.  One 
informant mentioned increasing documentation. 
8.  To what extent does inter-rater disagreement (i.e., dissonance) affect SPE 
efficacy?   
Rating dissonance decreases SPE efficacy, but not very strongly.  
Dissonance is linked to evaluator role overload and is strongly affected by fear of 
supplier dispute, which is increased by lower SPE accuracy.  Some evidence 
suggests that dissonance is increased by inflated ratings.   
Managerial Implications 
Buy-side evaluators overall reported that SPEs are somewhat effective in 
mitigating the risk of future adverse selection, and they were rather ambivalent as to 
whether SPEs motivate suppliers to perform.  However, some suppliers interviewed 
reported that SPEs indeed motivate them to perform well.  In addition to asking 
respondents to rate the efficacy of their most-recently completed SPE, respondents 
were asked to rate the extent to which he or she relied on past performance in 
making an award decision in his or her most recent source selection.  The average 
midland response (4.34 on a 7-point scale) raises questions as to the extent that 
SPEs reduce the risk of future adverse selection.     
In examining SPE efficacy, several novel factors emerged. For example, 
some main findings centered around the dissonance among multiple performance 
evaluators on a single contract. Another major finding entailed the importance of a 
justified and accurate rating. These constructs significantly affect SPE efficacy 
either directly or indirectly. The findings herein introduce a plethora of implications 
for supplier management, discussion of which follows.   
Rating dissonance reflected the extent to which raters struggled to reach 
consensus on the supplier’s rating(s) and/or narrative justification. Overall, the 
magnitude of rating dissonance was not high.  Nonetheless, rating dissonance 
decreases SPE efficacy.  Rating dissonance did not relate directly to a sufficient 
definition of the work to be performed by the contractor.  Neither was rating 
dissonance related directly to the accuracy of the SPE.  Rating dissonance may be 
attributed to a lack of a common meaning of performance criteria and of rating 
definitions.  Looking at the post hoc tests and at Appendices D (evaluators’ 
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recommended policy changes) and E (reasons for dissonance), it is apparent that 
criteria and rating meanings are not well defined by the buying team ex ante.        
The research also offers explanations for dissenting evaluations among 
multiple performance evaluators.  For example, leaders should manage evaluator 
workload to ensure they have sufficient time to perform their past performance 
evaluation duties.  Manning (staffing) models should be more precisely developed 
to account for not only dollars obligated and the number of contracts awarded 
annually, but other time-consuming tasks such as the quantity of SPEs.  This 
research revealed that, on average, SPEs consume nearly two days of effort by 
buyers to conduct the SPE and two weeks by suppliers to react to them.  These 
transaction costs should be extrapolated over all contracts requiring a SPE to 
determine total transaction costs of using a manual SPE policy and reporting 
system.  Next, alternatives could be explored to determine whether commercially 
available supplier management systems could reduce total costs and improve 
accuracy and SPE efficacy simultaneously.  Hence, can commercially available 
systems automate any of the performance measurement and SPE reporting 
processes such that transaction costs could be decreased?  And, can a 
commercially-available system improve the variables that affect SPE efficacy such 
as accuracy, rating inflation, communication, workload, fairness, sufficiency of the 
requirement definition, perceived usefulness, rating justification, sufficient rating 
definitions, sufficient performance criteria definitions, links between performance 
levels and assigned SPE ratings, relationship quality, fear of a supplier dispute, and 
rating dissonance?   
The greatest factor determining SPE efficacy was rating justification.  Thus, 
for those seeking to increase SPE efficacy, efforts should be made to more 
thoroughly justify ratings.  This research offers insights as to how to improve rating 
justifications.  First, buying organizations can implement information technology 
systems that are useful.  Additionally, buying organizations can address the effort 
required to justify a SPE.  This can be done by making more time available to 
evaluators to conduct SPEs by hiring more evaluators, by dedicating evaluators to 
the task of supplier performance evaluation, or by reducing evaluators’ non-SPE 
duties.  Rather than addressing workload capacity, organizations can seek to 
reduce the amount of effort required to produce a sufficiently justified rating.  The 
most logical means would be via process automation (e.g., a supplier management 
information technology system).  Some evidence suggests that buying 
organizations can improve rating justifications by sufficiently defining rating 
definitions.  To do so, it may be necessary to tailor ratings and their definitions to 
the particular goods or services being procured.  Sourcing teams should further 
define performance criteria, how each will be measured, and develop thresholds for 
each that unambiguously lead to the specific performance ratings.  These 
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performance criteria and rating definitions should be defined in the request for 
proposals and requirements documents, and then set in the resulting contract.  
Consequently, the supplier would know precisely how its levels of actual 
performance will translate into performance ratings, and it will more likely believe 
and accept the ratings as legitimate.  In turn, this research suggests that SPEs will 
more effectively motive the supplier to increase performance and will better inform 
future source selections (i.e., reduce the risk of adverse selection).  A commercially 
available supplier management system may prove useful as it would instill structure 
into the measurement and calculation of performance levels and help automatically 
translate performance into SPE ratings.  Therefore, those organizations that do not 
use structured SPM applications should consider doing so.  Buying organizations 
could also develop a SPE quality index as a means to periodically audit SPE 
quality.    
A central construct affecting SPE efficacy appears to be the accuracy of the 
evaluations.  In fact, lower accuracy is directly related to supplier rebuttals.  This is 
consistent with the literature.  “Strategic sourcing is not possible without tools for 
measurement, analysis and follow-up of the category.  Without data, the work 
changes from being problem-solving based on facts to being a debate about 
opinions” (Carlsson, 2015, p. 126).  While the overall sentiment in the sample was 
that SPEs are somewhat accurate, of all constructs measured, accuracy varied the 
most.  Accuracy was found to be affected by communication bi-directionality, 
communication formality, buyer fairness, leverage attitude, and sufficiency of the 
requirement definition.  Accuracy of SPEs was also affected by insufficiently defined 
requirements.  It is difficult to assess that which is not understood or that which can 
have multiple interpretations.  Thus, buying teams should not move forward in 
contracting with ill-defined requirements.  Additionally, prospective suppliers should 
strive to ensure that the buyer thoroughly defines its requirements.  For services, an 
independent requirements ombudsman could help in this regard.  Some evidence 
suggests that accuracy is degraded by rating inflation.   
SPE efficacy is not the only consequence at stake.  For-profit buying 
organizations often use SPEs to rank suppliers then reward or penalize them 
according to the ranking.  The DoD recently implemented such a program dubbed 
the superior supplier incentive program (USD AT&L, 2015).  If any of the underlying 
SPE and supporting performance data is inaccurate, the validity of rankings may be 
suspect.  Ultimately, an undeserving supplier receiving benefits and recognition 
may displace a deserving supplier.      
This research highlights the limitation of relying on largely manual SPE 
policies, procedures, and supporting information technology (e.g., CPARS).  In the 
federal government, there is no single structured information technology system 
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and process to systematically collect, store, and synthesize supplier performance 
information.  Yet supplier performance management systems are common in the 
for-profit sector.  Examples include Iasta’s SmartSupplier scorecard tool, 
SAP/Ariba’s Supplier Performance Management module, and BravoSolution’s 
Supplier Performance Management tool.  These structured, web-enabled tools 
could standardize metrics, performance data recording, analysis, rating 
determination, and reporting.  They also offer dashboard-like scorecards to assess 
individual suppliers and common groups of suppliers (e.g., by commodity family or 
by industry).   
Such a structured tool could alleviate many of the weaknesses that 
deteriorate SPE accuracy, facilitate inadequate rating justifications, and 
accommodate rater dissonance, while bolstering the ability to manage suppliers’ 
performance levels.  Such a tool could reduce or eliminate the many instances of 
incomplete ratings (e.g., rating categories not rated) by, as shown in this research, 
improving perceived accuracy, perceived usefulness, and communication bi-
directionality.  Automated, more fact-based data collection and use could also 
reduce the instances of changes to SPEs by higher authorities (e.g., “reviewing 
officials”), either due to need for correction or due to human manipulation to attain 
alternative goals.  Automation would also enable more frequent SPE feedback to 
the supplier and, thus, reduce recency bias that can plague long-interval 
evaluations.  More fact-based evaluations should also alleviate the need for 
evaluators to solicit suppliers to write their own evaluations – as was common in the 
sample.  The value of non-independently-derived performance information is 
suspect.  It may result only in the supplier’s opportunity to provide marketing 
material, increases the supplier’s transaction costs, and could be billable to the 
customer under a non-fixed-price-type contract.  Policy could also address whether 
the practice of suppliers writing their own performance evaluations is allowable.   
Automation could also reduce transaction costs required to conduct SPEs.  
In fiscal year 2015 alone, 2,228,275 SPEs were either conducted, in-process, or 
required to be conducted (i.e., overdue) (Naval Sea Logistics Center Portsmouth, 
2015).  Assuming: (1) a consistent number of SPEs annually, (2) a rate of pay of 
government evaluators and contractor employees equivalent to a GS-13, step 5, (3) 
a fringe benefit rate of 36.25% (OMB, 2008), (4) that 19% of SPEs will be rebutted, 
(4) that contractors spend 2 hours on non-rebutted SPEs and 80 hours on rebutted 
SPE, and (5) that buyers spend 8 hours on each SPE – each as found in this 
research (medians), SPEs will require the full effort of 26,512 full-time equivalents 
and cost $2.99 billion annually.   
This research confirms a halo effect (i.e., rating inflation) attributed to a fear 
of supplier dispute.  This research corroborates previous anecdotal reports that 
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evaluators and reviewing officials change (i.e., increase) ratings in order to: (1) 
avoid conflict, (2) protect a program, (3) preserve the supplier relationship, (4) gain 
leverage over the supplier, and (4) avoid harming a supplier’s future business 
opportunities.  More objective performance measures explicitly linked to precisely 
defined ratings could be used to increase supplier buy-in to ratings, thereby 
reducing fear of supplier dispute and rating inflation.    
Some performance evaluators believe it acceptable to use the SPE rating as 
leverage—either (or both) as a threat to a supplier during performance and prior to 
a SPE or as a means to extract concessions post hoc from a supplier in exchange 
for a more favorable SPE rating.  However, few respondents acted on those 
attitudes.  The survey data from performance evaluators was corroborated by 
testimonies from suppliers.  Such an attitude toward leverage was marginally 
related to lower SPE accuracy and had a small effect.  Nonetheless, since accuracy 
was found to be a central construct leading to SPE efficacy, unintended uses of 
SPEs as leverage should be explicitly addressed in training and policy.   
Suppliers questioned the utility and accuracy of SPEs that are conducted at 
a parent-contract level (e.g., IDIQ) versus a task-order level.  This practice should 
be explored further to determine the extent to which higher-level reporting hinders 
SPE efficacy (i.e., motivating supplier performance and mitigating the risk of future 
adverse selection by informing future buyers).   
This research highlights the benefits of building and maintaining quality 
relationships – those characterized by high trust and buyer satisfaction.  In the SPE 
process, relationship quality decreases supplier rebuttals and reduces the 
evaluators' fear of a supplier dispute, which, in turn, reduces rater dissonance and 
increases SPE efficacy.  Relationship quality is degraded by evaluator turnover.  
Thus, once assigned, buying organizations should seek to retain supplier 
performance evaluators in that role.  On complex, long-term contracts, evaluators, 
over time, develop a thorough understanding of the supplier’s processes, 
deliverables, how to evaluate performance, and how to communicate and 
cooperate to accomplish the objectives of the contract.  When this tacit knowledge 
is interrupted, relationships suffer.  The bi-directionality and formality of 
communications also affect relationship quality.  Thus, working level communication 
should not be stifled and formal channels to communicate should be established 
and maintained.   
Theoretical Implications 
Perhaps most importantly, this research suggests that in order for SPEs to 
be effective in motivating higher levels of supplier performance and in mitigating the 
risk of future adverse selection, those consumers of the information (i.e., the current 
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suppliers and future buyers) must believe the SPE is true.  As such, SPE accuracy 
and sufficient rating justifications become the essential factors explaining SPE 
efficacy.  The acceptance of feedback affects employees’ responses to feedback 
(Ilgen et al., 1979).  “Acceptance refers to the recipient’s belief that the feedback is 
an accurate portrayal of his or her performance” (Ilgen et al., 1979, p. 356).  
Further, constructs such as surveillance (i.e., monitoring) and leverage (i.e., 
opportunism) that are key components of agency theory and transaction costs 
economics are less impactful.  Thus, of the four theories relied upon to explain SPE 
efficacy – agency theory, organizational behavior, social exchange theory, and 
channel communication, it appears that organizational behavior theory is 
paramount – specifically, human performance.  This is extraordinary since most 
industrial buyer-supplier exchange literature relies primarily on theories such as 
agency theory, transaction cost economics, resource-based view of the firm, 
contingency theory, social exchange theory, channel communications, systems 
theory, and game theory.  Of all theories, organizational theory represents only 
seven percent of theories relied upon in supply chain research (Defee et al., 2010).  
We now know which literature will likely be most instructive in pointing supply chain 
scholars to the most relevant phenomenon to explain supplier performance 
motivation and buyer uncertainty avoidance.  Consistent with human performance 
literature, such phenomenon associated with the acceptance of performance 
feedback might include: (1) expertise of the source of feedback, (2) credibility of the 
source of feedback, (3) the recipient’s trust in the source’s motives of the feedback, 
(4) consistency of feedback, and (5) specific justifications for the feedback (Ilgen et 
al., 1979).     
Agency theory has been applied to many facets of buyer–supplier exchange 
relationships.  In this study, two dimensions of agency operate simultaneously, and 
a third novel dimension emerged.  First, the supplier is considered an agent of the 
buyer in promulgating the buyer’s mission.  Second, the buyer team is comprised of 
multiple agents to itself.  In the case of multiple evaluators in different sub-
organizations, multiple agency relationships exist, and each can hold different 
interests.  The third unsuspected dimension of agency pertains to the program (i.e., 
the requirement).  In some cases, both performance evaluators and supplier 
employees could begin to identify more with the program than with their employers.  
In other words, sometimes, what is advantageous for the program can supersede 
what is advantageous for either the buyer team or the supplier.  This explains the 
halo effect afforded a supplier who fails in one instance of performance, yet the 
evaluator does not mention the failure in the SPE because of reluctance to taint the 
program or the supplier’s chance for future business.  Thus, there appears to be 
opportunity to examine the antecedents and consequences of quasi-agency 
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relationships to understand under what circumstances such a quasi-agency 
emerges and the resultant effects. 
Additionally, this research identifies an omitted dimension of the economics 
of information theory, and thus expands its application from business-to-consumer 
contexts to business-to-business contexts.  It often pays for a supplier to reduce a 
buyer’s perceived risk of transacting with a supplier ex ante via use of costly signals 
such as: (1) advertising (to establish brand image and to make promises), (2) 
warranties (to signal high quality), and (3) premium prices (to signal high, unique 
value).  However, as reported by suppliers, it also may pay to incur the transaction 
costs to conceal poor performance information and thereby preserve reputation - an 
intangible resource.  If suppliers can dispute and effectively negotiate ratings, they 
have a chance to prevent future buyers from discovering their true reputation.  This 
information cloaking serves as a sort of reverse signaling and can increase the 
buyer’s ex ante costs of information acquisition.  If contracts are not lost due to a 
buyer’s ignorance, the transaction costs of concealment may be worth the effort.   
This research discovered that there may be different forms of leverage 
employed by buy-side performance evaluators.  Proactive leverage manifests as a 
threat, and is used to get a supplier to do something (e.g., improve performance).  
Quid pro quo leverage is a favor (e.g., a more favorable, inflated SPE) with an 
expectation of payback (i.e., a debt owed).  Both forms of leverage are present in 
SPEs.  More research is needed to understand whether the different forms have 
differing effects on SPE accuracy.  Ethical decision making theory may explain why 
differences in types of leverage exist.  There is significant variability among different 
individuals’ ability to recognize ethical issues, and this recognition is a function of 
the individual’s degree of ethical sensitivity (Sparks and Hunt 1998).  In Rest’s 
(1986) model, an individual identifies alternative courses of action and considers 
the likely consequences of each alternative as they affect the interests, welfare, or 
expectations of each party involved.  Consequences of being exposed in exercising 
quid pro quo leverage may be perceived as more severe than those of proactive 
leverage.     
Finally, this research contributes several new scales that reliably and validly 
measure key phenomenon in supplier performance management.  A scale was 
developed to measure SPE efficacy, including its two components of motivating 
current supplier performance and mitigating the risk of adverse selection in a future 
source selection.  This research also developed valid new scales for rating 
dissonance, rating justification, and fear of supplier dispute.  These scales can be 
used in future research of buyer-supplier exchange. 
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Study Limitations 
This research is not without limitations.  First, the sample size of the 
quantitative data is relatively small.  A small data set precludes the use of more 
robust statistical techniques such as covariance-based structural equation 
modeling.  Additionally, the response rate is quite low.  A low response rate calls 
into question the external validity (i.e., generalizability) of the results and raises 
suspicion of systematic response biases.  The response may have been subdued 
by several factors.  First, the survey was necessarily lengthy.  The fifty percent 
attrition rate suggests that many who started the survey did not finish it, and survey 
length could have been the cause.  Another contributor to the attrition rate could be 
those officials who were not part of the target population who accessed the survey 
to validate its purpose.  However, had all respondents who initiated the survey 
completed it, the response rate and numbers of respondents would still have been 
low.  Second, past performance data is considered sensitive information.  Even 
though measures were taken to mitigate this issue (e.g., an anonymous survey, no 
supplier identities collected, and no specific contract action identifiers collected), 
some prospective respondents may have been uncomfortable participating.  A 
contributing factor may have been the recent data breach by the Office of 
Personnel Management involving the loss of sensitive information of 21 million 
government employees (Nelson and Tau, 2015).  While the response rate is low, it 
is not uncommon in business research.  Melnyk et al., (2012) revealed a sharp 
decline in response rates starting in 2002, with a steady decline of 1% annually.  
Five top journals reported low-end survey response rates ranging from 3% to 8%.   
Another limitation of this paper is the lack of a quantitative test of emerged 
propositions surrounding the effects of SPE efficacy on supplier outcomes.  Thus, 
while serving as a foundation, future research should expand and test the 
propositions developed herein.  These propositions lend themselves well to cross-
sectional data collected via survey.  The research also employed a limited number 
of interviews.  While rich insights were gleaned from experienced informants, other 
related phenomenon may be omitted with few informants.   
SPE efficacy was measured by a six-item scale.  However, only one of the 
six items measured the extent to which SPEs affect the supplier’s motivation to 
increase performance.  The other five items measured the extent that SPEs 
mitigate the risk of future adverse selection.  Future research could refine the scale 
by adding more items to measure the former dimension of SPE efficacy thereby 
bolstering construct reliability and validity.  Additionally, in the PLS SEM model, 
rating justification and rating dissonance accounted for only 31% of the variance in 
SPE efficacy. Future research could explore additional variables affecting SPE 
efficacy.  
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SPE efficacy was measured from the perspective of the buyer-side 
performance evaluator.  However, the users of the information – future buyer teams 
who assess the risk of adverse selection and suppliers who inform whether the SPE 
motivated increased performance – would likely be better able to determine the 
level of SPE efficacy.  Nonetheless, since evaluators monitor performance, they 
have insight as to whether suppliers attempted to increase performance.  
Additionally, many of the evaluator respondents served on the source selection 
team for the contract for which they reported or served on other source selection.  
Thus, the evaluators likely offer reliable judgement as to whether the SPE will be 
effective in mitigating future adverse selection.      
Rating inflation and sufficiency of rating definition were each assessed using 
a single-item scale.  For this reason, they were not modeled in the PLS SEM.  
Nonetheless, rating inflation and rating definition were analyzed in post hoc tests by 
forming groups of high and low values.  These tests are contingent on the reliable 
and valid measure of high and low rating inflation and high and low sufficiency of 
rating definitions.  Future research could develop scales to assess rating inflation 
and rating definition using multiple items thereby establishing the reliability of these 
latent constructs.   
Relationship quality is comprised of three concepts per the measurement 
scale developed by Palmatier (2008) and adopted herein – trust, satisfaction, and 
commitment.  In this sample, the three concepts did not all load on the same factor 
in the EFA; items measuring commitment loaded on a separate factor.  This may be 
a nuance of a government sample since the Competition in Contracting Act limits 
long-term commitment. 
 The sample could be affected by self-selection bias.  Those respondents to 
the survey (buyers) and interview informants (suppliers) who were highly 
dissatisfied with the CPARS policy and/or system, or perhaps highly satisfied and 
resistant to change, could have been more inclined to respond to the survey.  
Nonetheless, a review of the open comments fields from the survey showed a 
balance of favorable and unfavorable perspectives.   
Future Research Directions 
Future research could quantitatively test the propositions surrounding the 
consequences of SPE efficacy and accuracy on suppliers.  Such a comprehensive 
model with many variables and successive dependent variables could be tested via 
structural equation modeling.   
 One aspect of SPE efficacy concerns ongoing contractor performance 
management.  Due to the impressive effects on buyer performance (Cormican & 
Cunningham, 2007), supplier performance management (SPM) is an essential best 
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practice in business-to-business sourcing (Gordon, 2008; Talluri & Sarkis, 2002).  
Despite the demonstrated value of SPM systems in the for-profit sector, the 
government lacks a coherent strategy and a consistent means to manage 
contractor performance.  A recent study compares the usage rate of SPM systems 
among best-in-class firms from the for-profit sector (53%) to the public sector (all 
levels of government—32%; Dwyer, 2011).  Whereas contractor performance is 
closely measured and managed for  major systems acquisitions, the management 
of contractor performance on service contracts—where the Department of Defense 
spends the majority of its contracted funds—is often deficient and inconsistent 
(GAO, 2001).  The government’s void of SPM might explain the variance in raters’ 
ability to efficiently conjure sufficient facts to support a past performance 
assessment/rating.  The obvious question then becomes, why does the government 
restrict the purpose of its SPE system (i.e., CPARS) to informing future source 
selections?  Is it worthwhile to integrate past performance with a system to manage 
contractor performance during the contract (versus after contract performance, or 
once per year)?  Future research could deploy a SPM system as a test case on a 
limited set of transactions.  Using a quasi-experimental design, comparisons could 
be made to a control group that uses the organization’s status quo means of 
supplier management.    
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Conclusion 
Organizations outsource a substantial portion of their missions. With 
increased reliance on suppliers, supplier performance management and risk 
reduction via supplier selection become paramount.  However, organizations 
struggle to consistently, efficiently, and meaningfully evaluate supplier performance.  
This research examined the efficacy of supplier performance evaluations.  Major 
factors affecting SPE efficacy include inaccurate evaluations and poor rating 
justifications.  Consequently, often, performance information is not relied upon to 
make trade-offs in best value source selections.  To explore the efficacy of supplier 
performance evaluations, this research first tested a conceptual model of key 
antecedents from the literature using a sample of performance evaluators of 131 
contracts.  Factors found to affect the efficacy of supplier performance evaluations 
include rating inflation, rating justification, and rating dissonance. Rating justification 
was affected by role overload, perceived accuracy and perceived usefulness.   
Perceived accuracy was affected by buyer fairness, leverage attitude, rating 
inflation, communication bi-directionality, communication formality, and the 
sufficiency of the requirement definition.  Rating dissonance was affected by 
evaluator role overload and fear of supplier dispute, which was, in turn, affected by 
relationship quality and perceived accuracy.  To explore consequences of SPE 
efficacy on suppliers, several suppliers were interviewed.  The interview data was 
used to develop 36 propositions.  From these findings, important managerial and 
theoretical implications are drawn and future research directions are identified.  The 
central constructs involved in SPE efficacy appear to be perceived accuracy and 
rating justification.  It is clear that this stream of research can pay significant 
dividends given the substantial reliance of organizations on suppliers. 
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Appendix A. Survey Invitation   
Dear Sir or Ma’am, 
You have been selected to participate in a study of supplier performance evaluation 
(SPE)/past performance.  This research was approved by DASN RDA, and by the 
Office of Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (NPRST/BUPERS-
14), Navy Personnel Command, (deemed exempt from a report control symbol).  
The research is funded by a grant through the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Acquisition Research Program (N00244-15-1-0057).   
The purpose of this study is to identify the factors affecting SPE efficacy, and how 
SPE efficacy, in turn, affects supplier outcomes such as performance.  I respectfully 
request your assistance to complete the web-based survey located at the following 
link:   
https://wku.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_cAsofr69WYG75qd   
Your participation is anonymous.   
Your participation is voluntary.  Responses are vital to conducting valid research 
that represents your knowledge and experience.   
Please complete the survey no later than [date].  The survey should take 
approximately 25 minutes to complete. 
For your time, you will be eligible to enter a random drawing for a new Apple iPad 
Mini, 16 GB, WiFi.  To enter, follow the instructions at the end of the survey.  (This 
raffle is not funded with federal grant funds.) 
At the end of the survey, you will also have an opportunity to share ideas for 
improving SPE/past performance data collection and use.   
If you have any questions about the study, please contact Dr. Tim Hawkins by email 
to timothy.hawkins@wku.edu or at 270.745.2412, or contact the WKU Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) Compliance Manager, Mr. Paul Mooney at 270.745.2129.  
I know your time is valuable.  Thank you so much for your support.  
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Appendix B. Survey 
You are invited to participate in a study of Past Performance Practices. Responses to 
this questionnaire will be used to analyze the government’s use of contractor past 
performance information.  Your response is requested no later than [date].    
 
This DoD-funded research is being conducted through Western Kentucky University. 
Participation from professionals, such as you, is very important for the success of this 
research. Your response will help the researchers analyze the government’s collection 
and use of past performance information.  
 
The questionnaire is anonymous; your responses cannot be linked to you.  There are 
not necessarily “right answers.” 
 
Procedures. Your extent of participation in this research involves only the completion of 
this questionnaire. 
 
Synopsis. This is both an anonymous and voluntary questionnaire. (Please note, in 
order to obtain consistent and usable results, it is important that you answer all 
questions). It will take most respondents approximately 30 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. 
 
Risks and Benefits. Your participation in this research poses no known risk. You will be 
asked questions pertaining to a contractor performance assessment report (CPAR).  
There will be no personal benefits beyond having contributed your expertise to this 
important research.  Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected 
against release to unauthorized persons.  If desired, you may contact the researcher 
below if you would like to receive a report of the results of the study.   
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. All records of this study will be kept confidential and, since 
responses are anonymous, your privacy will not be at risk.  No information will be 
publicly accessible which could identify you as a participant. Responses will be 
maintained by WKU for three years, after which they will be destroyed.   
 
Points of Contact. Should you have any questions or comments regarding this survey, 
please contact the Principal Investigator: Dr. Tim Hawkins, Lt Col (ret), USAF, 270-745-
2412, timothy.hawkins@wku.edu.  Any other questions or concerns may be addressed 
to the WKU IRB Compliance Manager, Mr. Paul Mooney, 270-745-2129.   
 
Thank you for your time and your participation in this effort.   
By clicking on the “Proceed” button, I am acknowledging that I have read and 
understand this information, that I understand the nature and purpose of 
this study – including its risks and benefits, and that I agree to voluntarily 
participate in this online survey. I also understand that I may discontinue at 
any time simply by exiting this website. 
  
 □  Proceed          □  Exit 
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Section 1 
 
Instructions:  Please answer the questions in this questionnaire pertaining to the 
selected CPAR (or ACCAS/CCASS for construction/A&E). Recommend you have a copy 
of the completed CPAR available as you complete the survey.   
 
 
Did you collaborate with at least one other person in completing this CPAR? In 
other words, the decision on what ratings would be assigned and the 
narrative content was not yours alone; you sought consensus with or input 
from at least one other person. 
□ Yes     □ No 
 
What was the total number of people who measured, evaluated, reviewed and 
reported on this contractor’s performance on this contract/task order/delivery 
order (even if done outside of the CPAR system)?   
 
 
What is the name of any automated system(s) (other than CPARS/CCASS) 
used to collect and/or track contractor performance information? 
 
 
For this contract/task order/delivery order, what type of CPAR was 
completed? 
  □ Architect-Engineer (ACASS Module) 
  □ Construction (CCASS Module) 
  □ Systems 
  □ Non-Systems (Services, Information Technology, Operations Support, etc.)  
 
For this contract/task order/delivery order, what was the PSC/FSC code?   
 
Please estimate the total number of hours spent by the Government team to 
complete the CPAR.  Include only the time spent directly working on the 
CPAR (including collecting performance data), and exclude idle time 
awaiting action by another person.  Include the time from all parties 
involved (e.g., performance evaluators and reviewers). 
 
 
On this contract, how many “out of cycle” CPARs have ever been completed? 
 
 
On this contract, how is the contractor’s performance actively managed?  
(Note, “actively manage” herein means to continuously measure performance 
and to periodically communicate the buyer’s assessment of performance to the 
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contractor to foster continuous improvements throughout the period of 
performance.)  (Check all that apply): 
  □ We engage the contractor only when problems arise 
  □ Monthly (or more frequently) performance reviews with the contractor 
  □ Quarterly performance reviews with the contractor 
  □ Semi-annual performance reviews with the contractor 
  □ Annual performance reviews with the contractor 
  □ Supplier scorecard 
  □ Rank-order contractors according to performance 
  □ Objective performance measures consistently used 
  □ Subjective performance measures consistently used 
  □ We don’t manage contractor performance; that’s their job 
  □ Other (Explain): 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Completely Insufficient” and 7 
represents “Completely Sufficient”, please rate how sufficiently the CPAR 
ratings were justified. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following statements.   
The rationale for the assigned CPAR rating was thoroughly documented. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
An inspector general would conclude that the CPAR rating was 
sufficiently explained. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
We did not have the factual data to support the rating that the 
contractor deserved. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
Anyone who reads this CPAR will understand the ratings based on the 
supporting information in the report. 
 □ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
If I reported the contractor’s performance accurately, the contractor 
would have disputed/rebutted the rating(s). 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
While completing the CPAR, at least one member of the government 
team was concerned that the contractor might dispute the assigned rating. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
The Government was lenient in the CPAR rating in order to avoid the 
conflict associated with the contractor’s rebuttal., 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
To report the ratings that the contractor actually deserved would have 
consumed too much time responding to the contractor’s rebuttal.,  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
        Acquisition Research Program 
        Graduate School of Business & Public Policy                                             - 113 - 
        Naval Postgraduate School  
Someone on the government team either changed or influenced a change to 
the CPAR (at least one rating or narrative) in response to the contractor’s 
rebuttal., 
□ Yes     □ No      
If you answered “Yes” to the previous question, do you agree with all of the 
changes? 
□ Yes     □ No      
 
If the Reviewing Official (or any other individual) changed or influenced you to 
change at least one rating or narrative, why did he/she do so?  (Check all that 
apply): 
 
□ N/A; Nobody changed or influenced a change to at least one rating or narrative. 
□ To avoid time-consuming conflict  
□ The factual data/justification did not support the Assessing Official’s rating 
□ The contractor’s rebuttal had merit  
□ To preserve the relationship 
□ To protect the program 
□ A lesser rating would tarnish the contractor’s reputation 
□ A lesser rating could hinder the contractor’s ability to win future business  
□ To gain bargaining leverage over the contractor 
□ Other (Explain):   
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “No Monitoring of the Contractor” and 
7 represents “Extensive Monitoring of the Contractor”, rate the amount of 
government surveillance of the contractor’s performance in the following 
areas: 
a. Quality 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. Timeliness of Performance 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. Fulfillment of Performance Requirements in the specifications, drawings, 
Statement of Work, or Performance Work Statement  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. Compliance With Contract Terms & Conditions 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
The following section requests that you show the final ratings recorded in the CPAR.  
On the CPAR, were any rating categories not completed/rated?  □ Yes     □ No      
 
How many ratings and narratives did the contractor disagree with (i.e., 
request to be changed) in the initial CPAR?         
 
If a “non-systems” CPAR, what were the assigned ratings: 
Quality of product/service 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Schedule 
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□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Cost control (if applicable) 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Business relations 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Management of key personnel 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Utilization of small business 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
 
If a “systems” CPAR, what were the assigned ratings: 
Technical (quality of product) 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Product performance 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Systems engineering 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Software engineering 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Logistics support/sustainment 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Product assurance 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Other technical performance 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Schedule 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Cost Control 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Management 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Management responsiveness 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Subcontract management 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Program/other management 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
Utilization of small business 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
 
If the contract was for construction, what were the assigned ratings: 
Overall rating 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptiona l   
  
 
If the contract was for architect-engineering, what were the assigned ratings: 
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 Overall Rating 
□ Unsatisfactory     □ Marginal     □ Satisfactory     □ Very Good     □ Exceptional   
  
 
On the CPAR, how did you rate the following question:  “Given what I know 
today about the contractor’s ability to execute what he promised in his 
proposal, I ________ award to him today given that I had a choice.”  
□ definitely would not 
□ probably would not 
□ might or might not 
□ probably would  
□ definitely would 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
I am not given enough support to accomplish assigned objectives 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 It often seems like I have too much work for one person to do 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
The performance objectives on my job are too high 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
I am not given enough time to do what is expected of me on my job 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
It is ok for the Government to threaten the contractor with a lower CPAR rating. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
It is ok for the Government to use the CPAR as bargaining leverage with the contractor. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
If we give the contractor a CPAR that is better than what they deserve, the contractor 
should reciprocate in some way. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
Leverage can be gained by providing the contractor an overly favorable CPAR. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. The requirement was very well defined in the contract/task order/delivery order. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. The contract/task order/delivery order (including the statement of work, 
performance work statement, specification, drawings, etc.) defined the 
requirement very well. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. There were no flaws or omissions in the definition of the requirement (including 
the statement of work, performance work statement, specification, drawings, 
etc.). 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
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d. There were no ambiguities in the definition of the requirement (including the 
statement of work, performance work statement, specification, drawings, etc.).  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. The requirement, as defined in the contract/task order/delivery order, expressed 
to the contractor exactly what we needed. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Completely Unfair” and 7 represents 
“Completely Fair”, rate the following: 
1. To what extent was the contractor’s performance fairly evaluated considering 
the contractual responsibilities? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
2. To what extent was the contractor’s performance fairly evaluated given the 
amount of effort the contractor put forth? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
3. To what extent was the contractor’s performance fairly evaluated given the 
challenges of the contract? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
4. To what extent was the contractor’s performance fairly evaluated for the work 
the contractor did well? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
5.  The contractor deserved the performance ratings it received. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. The information in the CPAR was accurate. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. The record of the contractor’s performance, as recorded in the CPAR, contains 
errors. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. The performance feedback in this CPAR is an accurate portrayal of the 
contractor’s performance. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. The government accurately measured the contractor’s performance level.  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. The government consistently measured the contractor’s performance level.  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. This CPAR was based solely on factual performance information/data. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
g. All of the assessed ratings could be traced back to records of contractor 
performance. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
h. One or more of the final CPAR ratings was inflated (i.e., greater than the 
contractor deserved). 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
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i.  I use CPARs to actively manage the contractor’s performance throughout the 
period of performance rather than solely to report the performance at the end of 
a period of performance.  (Note, “actively manage” herein means to 
continuously measure performance and to periodically communicate the buyer’s 
assessment of performance to the contractor to foster continuous improvements 
throughout the period of performance.) 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
j. Had ten other qualified people completed this CPAR, each would have arrived at the exact 
same ratings.   
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
k. Had ten other qualified people completed this CPAR, each would have arrived at the same 
justifications for each rating. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree”  and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. Using the CPAR process/system improves my job performance 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. Using the CPAR process/system enhances my effectiveness on the job. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. The CPAR process/system helped me to report contractor performance quickly.  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. Using the CPAR process/system makes it easier to do my job. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. The CPAR process/system ensured that I accurately report contractor 
performance. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. The CPAR process/system ensured that the contractor received a fair evaluation 
of performance. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
g. It is futile to report the real ratings that the contractor deserves since 
management will either change the ratings or make me change the ratings. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
h. If the FAR did not require me to complete a CPAR, I would not do it. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
g. Using CPARS in my job increases my productivity. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
h. I find CPARS useful in my job. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Very Infrequent” and 7 represents 
“Very Frequent”, estimate the frequency of communicate with the contractor 
over a typical four-week period for each communication mode below:   
a. Face-to-face interaction  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. Telephone interaction 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. Written letters, correspondence 
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□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. E-mail/Text Messaging 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. Web conference/VTC 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. Online chat 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “None” and 7 represents “A Lot”:  
a. How much performance feedback do you provide the contractor? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. How much performance feedback does this contractor provide to you?  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
Rate the following on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” 
and 7 represents “Strongly Agree”.   
a. In coordinating our activities with this contractor, formal communication 
channels are followed (i.e., channels that are regularized, structured modes 
versus casual, informal, word-of-mouth modes). 
b. We have a formal system to track the performance of the contractor.  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. We have a formal program for evaluating the contractor.  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. The source of our information about our evaluation program is predominantly 
word-of-mouth. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. Our evaluation process is conducted through standard procedures for collecting, 
analyzing, and reporting contractor performance information.  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. Our organization regrets the decision to do business with this contractor.  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. Overall, we are very satisfied with this contractor. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. We are very pleased with what this contractor does for us. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. Our organization is not completely happy with this contractor. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. If we had to do it all over again, we would still choose to use this contractor. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. This contractor keeps promises made to our organization. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. This contractor is always frank and truthful with us. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. We believe the information this contractor provides us. 
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□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. This contractor is genuinely concerned that our organization succeeds. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. When making decisions, this contractor considers our welfare as well as their 
own. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. This contractor is trustworthy. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. We have a strong sense of loyalty to this contractor. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. We expect this contractor to be working with us a long time. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. We are really committed to developing a working relationship with this 
contractor. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. We see this relationship as a long-term alliance. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. This CPAR will help inform evaluators about this contractor’s performance risk in 
a future source selection evaluation. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. If future source selection evaluators read this CPAR, they can assess the risk of 
dealing with this contractor. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. This CPAR will reduce future source selection evaluators’ uncertainty about this firm’s 
likelihood of performing similar work well. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
d. This CPAR can help future source selection evaluators to make a contract award decision. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. On this contract/delivery order/task order, I have seen/heard evidence that CPARS 
motivates the contractor to perform well. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. With this CPAR, future source selection evaluators can be confident in their assessment of 
the risk of this contractor successfully performing on a similar future contract. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Strongly Disagree” and 7 represents 
“Strongly Agree”, rate the following: 
a. Between myself, the “Reviewing Official,” and other performance evaluators, 
there was some disagreement on at least one CPAR rating. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
b. Significant effort was required to deliberate with others as to what rating(s) to 
assign. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
c. At least one performance evaluator and/or “Reviewing Official” believed that at 
least one rating or narrative justification should have been different. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
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d. The government team had difficulty reaching consensus on the ratings or 
narrative justification.  
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
e. Each member of the government team evaluating performance completely 
agreed with each assigned rating. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
f. While completing the CPAR, I was concerned about whether someone else would 
disagree with the ratings. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
If there was disagreement within the government team on any aspect of the 
CPAR narratives or ratings, please explain why.   
 
 
Before the CPAR was entered into the CPAR system, the Government solicited 
input from the contractor about its view of what ratings or narrative 
justifications should be in the CPAR.   
 □ Yes     □ No      
Before the CPAR was entered into the CPAR system, the contractor submitted 
input about its view of what ratings or narrative justifications should be in the 
CPAR.   
 □ Yes     □ No    
If yes, on a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 represents “None” and 7 represents “A 
Lot”, to what extent did the final CPAR ratings and narrative justifications 
resemble the contractor’s input? 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
 
On this contract, how many relationship connections existed between 
individual government employees and contractor employees? Note, in cases 
where one contractor connected with several government employees (and vice 
versa), count each as a seperate connection. 
 
Note:  The following questions are general in nature.  They do not necessarily 
pertain to the chosen CPAR. 
 
For the most recent source selection in which you were involved and that included 
past performance as an evaluation factor for award, to what extent did the past 
performance rating affect the source selection/award decision, on a scale of 1 to 7   
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7  □ N/A 
 
What type of incentive does this contract/task order/delivery order contain – 
if any?  (Check all that apply): 
□ Award Fee     □ Cost-Based Incentive Fee     □ Award Term     □ Performance-based 
Payments 
□ Performance-Based Incentive Fee     □ Delivery-Based Incentive Fee     □ Liquidated 
Damages clause 
□ Other (Please Explain):       
□ This Contract Does Not Contain an Incentive   
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What is the contract type? 
□ Fixed Price     □ Cost Reimbursement     □ Time and Materials     □ Labor-Hour     □ 
Other   
□ Hybrid (multiple contract types) 
 
What type of supply or service is the contractor providing? 
□ Service □ Construction □ Supplies/Commodities/Spares □ Weapon 
System 
□ Other Capital Equipment  
 
Program/contract description 
 
What is the current total dollar value of the contract/task order/delivery order 
(including all options)? 
 
 
At the time you completed the CPAR, what was the total duration of the 
contract/task order/delivery order (in months) from the date of contract 
award?  
Was this contract/task order/delivery order competed? 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “Not at all Critical” and 7 represents 
“Extremely Critical”, rate the criticality of the contracted item or service to 
your agency’s mission. 
□ 1     □ 2     □ 3     □ 4     □ 5     □ 6     □ 7 
The contractor for this past performance evaluation is a: 
□ Small business (includes SB, SDB, 8(a), woman-owned SB, veteran-owned SB, & 
HUBZONE)  
□ Large Business  
□ Ability One, Federal Prison Industries  
By which agency are you employed? 
 
Were you involved in the source selection (or negotiation if sole source) for 
this contract/task order/delivery order?  □ Yes     □ No 
 
What is the highest level of Acquisition Professional Development Program 
(APDP) certification that you hold? 
□ APDP Level 1     □ APDP Level 2    □ APDP Level 3     □ No APDP Certification 
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What is your career field? 
□ Quality Assurance     □ Program Management    □ Contracting     □ Engineering □ 
Logistics □ Other 
 
I am a: 
□  Program Manager □ Contracting Officer/Specialist  □ Quality Assurance 
Evaluator/COR/Inspector/COTR 
□  Product/Service End User   □ Other (Explain): 
 
The “Reviewing Official” was a: (Check all that apply) 
□  Program Manager □  Contracting functional □  Product/Service End User □  
General Officer/SES 
□  O-6/GS-15 □  Other  
 
Over the life of this contract, how many times has a performance evaluator 
changed/turned over?   
 
In how many different physical locations did contractor performance occur? 
 
 
Were you involved in writing or determining the technical 
specifications/statement of work for this contract/task order/delivery order?   
□ Yes     □ No 
 
What is the highest level of education that you have attained? 
□ High School Diploma / GED     □ Associates     □ Bachelors     □ Masters     □ 
Doctoral / Professional 
How many years of experience do you have evaluating contractor 
performance? 
 
What is your gender? 
□ Male    □ Female 
Can you think of any policy changes needed to improve the government’s 
collection and/or use of past performance information? (optional) 
 
We appreciate any comments or feedback you can provide on the topic of past 
performance in government contracting and/or this survey. (optional) 
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Appendix C. Interview Questionnaire 
Are CPARs important to your company? 
 If so, why? 
Does your company have any dedicated positions/personnel whose job it is to 
manage/oversee CPARs? 
How does the government’s CPAR process and IT system differ from those of your 
for-profit-sector clients? 
 Do for-profit-sector clients tend to give lower or higher (or the same) supplier 
ratings? 
 Do for-profit-sector clients offer a chance to respond to ratings? 
Are the past performance reports value-added?  Why or why not? 
What are the greatest weaknesses associated with the CPAR process and IT 
system?   
 Why are these weaknesses important? 
 How would you “fix” any CPARS processes and/or IT system if you could? 
The purposes of the government’s past performance information collection and use 
policy is to:  (1) inform source selection teams to mitigate the risk of adverse 
selection and (2) to motivate contractors to perform well.  Do you believe the 
CPARS processes and IT system accomplish these objectives?  Why or why not? 
 Do past performance evaluations motivate you to alter your effort/level of 
performance? 
 Do you believe past performance evaluations are effective in reducing a 
source selection teams’ uncertainty with respect to future performance of 
a prospective contractor? 
Have you ever received any past performance evaluations (ratings and/or 
narratives) that were less favorable than you expected?    
 If so, how many times? 
 Explain/elaborate.   
 What was the source of the disconnect in understanding?  
What communication strategies do you employ, if any, to mitigate surprises? 
Have you observed any issues with the timeliness of assessments (i.e., time from 
the end of a period of performance to receipt of CPAR)? 
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Do you ever discuss CPARS ratings with a buyer representative prior to receiving 
the assessment in the CPARS system?  
What kinds of differences in CPAR scoring methodology do you experience across 
multiple contracts and/or multiple government clients? 
Have you ever suspected or witnessed different perceptions of your firm’s 
performance from different buyer-side evaluators or their managers/leaders on the 
same contract action?  
 If so, why might different people on the buyer team hold different 
perceptions of your performance? 
 How do you react to or manage these difference? 
Have you ever received an inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading past performance 
evaluation? 
 If so, why might a past performance evaluation be inaccurate, incomplete, 
or misleading? 
Have you ever received a past performance evaluation with an inadequate 
justification for ratings? 
How important is your company’s reputation? 
Is it your philosophy (or is it your company’s philosophy) to contest any/all negative 
ratings and/or narratives? 
Do you or your company hold the position that you should protect the company’s 
reputation at all costs? 
 Has your company sought a rating change even though the rating was 
warranted? 
 Are the man-hours required to get a rating changed worth it? 
 Does your urgency to avoid negative evaluations change with the 
competitiveness of the market in which you do business? 
 Is the accuracy of the CPAR less important than your company’s reputation? 
Have you ever, or would you ever, offer concessions in order to alter/improve an 
anticipated negative CPAR? 
Has a less-than-expected CPAR rating ever caused your company/employees to 
change anything with how they perform the contracted work (i.e., “get even” 
informally)? 
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To what extent does the government appear to use the past performance 
evaluation as a way to actively manage performance throughout the performance 
period? 
Do poorly defined requirements or differences in expectations play a role in your 
satisfaction with a past performance evaluation?   
Why do customers change ratings? 
 Do customers ever trade a more favorable rating for some concession from 
the contractor? 
How have you reacted to past performance evaluations that appear inaccurate? 
 How would that affect the relationship with the customer? 
 How would that affect how much you value or prioritize the customer? 
 What factors do you consider when deciding whether to rebut a PP 
rating? 
How does buyer team turnover affect past performance evaluations? 
On average, how many man-hours do you spend responding to a PP evaluation 
(from receipt to completion of a report)? 
Do you ever suspect buyer opportunism in ratings? 
 Do you suspect that the government ever uses the PP rating/evaluation 
as leverage?   
Is the past performance evaluation process fair? 
Do you see inconsistent definitions of the ratings across CPARS? 
What else should I consider about the past performance process and/or outcomes? 
   
Demographics: 
How many past performance evaluations have you personally participated in?  
______ 
How many past performance evaluations has your organization participated in?  
______ 
Duty title:  _______________________________________________ 
Years of experience managing customer evaluations?  ____ 
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Gender:  ______ 
Industry: ______ 
Compete in competitive market(s)?  _____ 
Business size:  Large or Small? 
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Appendix D. Survey Respondent Recommendations                   
(Assessors) 
Can you think of any policy changes needed to improve the 
government’s collection and/or use of past performance? 
Code 
 “CPARS should not have a cost factor or it should be written 
differently  since  most of the time the cost are based on 
government's budget and the Contractor cannot impact cost 
except with personnel.” 
O 
 “Consistent application of rating criteria across DoD.  I have had 
contractors ask for their rating to be increased to bring it in line 
with what other services provide for the same service or product 
form the safe facility.” 
C 
 “1) Require AOs to complete and submit their assessments with 
30 days of end of the period of performance. / 2) Implement 
independent or outside performance evaluation of 
activity/organization Focal Points and Assessing Officials during 
their own individual performance assessments and retrain those 
coming up short.” 
A 
 “Not make it mandatory for source selection” O 
 “Under the new CPARS policy, the new evaluation area of  
"REGULATORY COMPLIANCE" was added.  This new 
evaluation area/criteria should be either "complied/Satisfactory" 
or "non-complied/Unsatisfactory" which is the true/accurate 
assessment for this area because this area simply can't be 
anything else (i.e., Exceptional, Very Good, Marginal).” 
CD 
 “The Past Performance Evaluation is complex yet depending on 
which lawyer or contracting officer you have their approach to 
this factor is very different.  More training on the application of 
the Past Performance within source selection is important.  
Additionally this act of evaluation for CPARS is a convoluted 
process and depending upon demeanor of an individual there 
could be very different ratings.” 
T 
A 
 “Allow greater accuracy of reporting.” A 
 “Service contracts are difficult to evaluate with the current 
CPARS measures” 
CF 
 “CPARS did not assist at all in the evaluating past performance 
for future contracts.  Most CPARS I reviewed had no narrative, 
so were not used.” 
I 
 “I think there should be more formal training for CPAR writers. 
There was no syllabus or anything for how to write CPARs, and 
I initially had to write CPARS on about 6 contracts that were 
complete before I checked in.  I read the guidance and solicited 
T 
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input from the people who actually worked on the contract and 
my appraisals went through a reviewing official who was familiar 
with the contracts, but I felt odd writing appraisals on contracts 
that I didn't work on.” 
 “It's not agency policy but proper tracking of CPARS being 
completed.  Additionally, each Command should look had which 
CPARS rating were assigned.  If over 50% of the ratings are 
Outstanding or Very Good, someone needs to review the 
CPARS to make sure the justification support the rating.” 
C 
 “An interim CPARS, though labor intensive, would improve the 
overall process.” 
T 
 “Standardization across platform types.   Limited CPARs 
requirements for Congressionally directed contractors.” 
C 
 “Collection of data must be balanced with the cost of having it 
reported to the government, and then analyzed across the 
distributed receiving team.” 
TC 
 “Would be more helpful if collected more often.” F 
 “Past Performance is a farce. We are not allowed to use Past 
Performance as a negative criteria [sic].  There is [sic] at least 
four companies that I know of where their Past performance is 
less than optimal and they are arrogant about it.  There is one 
company that tells the government, "To bad, this is what we are 
giving you".” 
O 
 “Consistent application of ratings.” C 
 “It is important that the rationale support the rating.  Any rating 
higher than satisfactory needs a really supportive rationale.”   
J 
 “I would like PP that is relevant to natural resources.  Also, 
CPARs does not consider that everything depends on the 
subcontractor.”   
S 
 “The CPAR does give the contractor a sense of how things are 
going from the Government's perspective, but I have NEVER 
known of a CPAR evaluation actually being used in a source 
selection.” 
PU 
 “Evaluators do need to follow the CPAR guidance and write 
objective narratives.  Ratings narratives that come across as 
"they're a bunch of nice guys" do nothing for a source selection 
team, and I have seen quite a few situations like I mention.  You 
then end up calling the authors to find out what the contractor's 
real performance is.” 
J 
A 
 “Things work very well as long as the correct ratings are 
assigned and not over inflated.” 
A 
 “The contracting entity should be required to review the 
evaluation in the system prior to release to the contractor.  Our 
organization has determined that a contracting officer be the 
Reviewing Official as many previous reports were forwarded to 
O 
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the contractor with information that did not match the 
documentation in file (inspection results) and/or provided 
feedback on issues not directly related to contractor 
performance” 
 “The government needs contractors to be better estimators of 
expected cost and technical performance.  Program managers 
must be able to trust the information that is provided by the 
contractor and have reasonable assurances that the numbers 
are realistic and not provided to "win the contract"  or otherwise 
look favorable with respect to competitors - only to later fail to 
deliver because there are no consequences for providing 'bad 
estimates'.  Therfore [sic], contracts should incentivize 
adherence to cost estimates.  Additionally, the contractors track 
record of accurately estimating work should be available to the 
govt to assess risk of a proposal for a solicitation.” 
O 
 “Focus on contractors who fail to perform.  Identify contractors 
who have reinvented themselves under a new company name 
in order to resurface and bid for contracts.” 
O 
 “CPARS is a valuable tool for assessing the contractor's 
performance, however when using previous CPARS during 
source selection for a new contract there is no value added on 
recurring service related contracts.  A CPAR from another 
location, Good or Bad, is a direct reflection of the individuals at 
that location and in most instances the company the is awarded 
the contract hires the in-place employees.” 
PU 
 “We could incorporate the PARs and CARS generated during 
the reporting period as backup or source data accessable [sic] 
to the COR, COR supervisor, PCO, Assessing official and 
reviewing official” 
J 
 “Consistency on the evaluations (Government wide) seems to 
be our major concern.” 
C 
 “Past performance training for all involved in the input and rating 
of contractors' performance.” 
T 
 “currently in source selection, the past performance of an 
offerror is boiled down to a yes/no - if they did have past 
performance, and it was satisfactory or better, then their past 
performance was rated acceptable, otherwise not acceptable.  
This is not enough information... there should be a larger range 
that the rating can fall within.  The current methodology renders 
the past performance teams efforts meaningless.” 
PU 
CD 
 “Keeping track of emails, phone conversations, or site visits 
would help the government to generate the CPAR.” 
J 
 “I think that the CPAR database needs to be accurately and 
constantly populated and CPARS completed.  I've found that 
during Source Selection Evaluations that not all contractors had 
a CPAR avaliable [sic] for past projects although a DoD project 
F 
C 
A 
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was presented for past performance review.  I think the CCASS 
ratings are too subjective.” 
 “There also seems to be some discretion on CPAR evaluation 
working from Purple for basic performance of the contract.  
Other start at a Green rating for basic performance and the 
contractor has to do over and above the contract to recieve [sic] 
a purple rating.  Disparity of starting points” 
C 
CD 
 “A better mechanism to align and compare the technical 
aspects of the work performed to the SOW/RFP being 
evaluated in a source selection.” 
RD 
 “Consistent application of the standards needs to be applied 
across program offices.” 
C 
 
 
We appreciate any comments or feedback you can provide on the 
topic of past performance in government contracting. 
 
Code 
 “In order for CPARS to truly be effective, major Commands need to 
look at the ratings for the CPARS for all contracts they have.  [A 
particular] command did this and additional training has resulted.  
This kind of oversight helps foster more honest and accurate 
ratings, than just "filling" in the box.” 
MO 
 “It would be great to have access to the Primary contractor 
performance rating od [sic] all sub-contractors.” 
S 
 “Need to improve government's awareness of why CPARs exist - 
that is, to inform future government source selection and protect the 
taxpayers.” 
PU 
 “Services need separate CPARS rating system - our PWS 
requirement is 100% performance, so no "exceptional" rating can 
ever be justified in the current system but several of our contractors 
perform such that an "exceptional" rating would be useful as a 
discriminator in source selections.” 
CF 
CD 
 “The close out CPAR should be a collective of the entire 
performance of the contract.” 
O 
 “There were times that the contracting officer would request we 
change the CPARS and did not want to give a negative review. Not 
specifically this contract but other that I was a COR on.” 
A 
 “CPARs DEFINITELY made a difference in the Contractors [sic] 
performance following low marks.  It was the ONLY way we could 
get the message across.  They felt they were so large they were 
immune to a low CPAR.” 
PU 
 “Should be tailored "down" for smaller efforts.” O 
 “The evaluation criteria [sic] is such that if a contractor completes CD 
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the assigned task, no matter how much pain and suffering the 
contract specialist, project manager, quality assurance specialist, 
technical representatives, and others, must go through to facilitate 
the contractor's completion, the rating is Satisfactory. The ratings do 
not accurately portray contractor performance, and actual 
performance needs to be hidden in the narratives.  This needs to 
change.” 
 “First step is getting the Government to use CPARS, and then make 
sure the justification support [sic] the rating.  One way our senior 
contracting officer does this is having a monthly COR report which 
requires a write up on the same categories as a CPAR.  This way 
you can use the monthly reports to help do the CPARS rating.” 
PU 
J 
 “Collection/reporting of PP is extremely valuable for future awards, 
yet because it is so subjective (moreso [sic] in the services arena 
than in production), it is not 100% reliable, and negative 
performance is often explained-away by the vendor.  Often it is 
iimpossible [sic] to contact the original evaluator due to personnel 
turnover or simple disinterest.” 
C 
A 
TU 
 “the past performances of contractors is only as accurate as the 
evaluation person's ability to assess the task completions and 
deliverables to conform to tasking specifications. I [sic] technically 
qualified individual should evaluate technical products...” 
O 
 “The entire Procurement & Source Selection system needs to be 
reassessed, because if everyone were following regulation there 
would be a few powerful companies that should not be allowed to 
perform government work.  not all contracts fit the same evaluation 
criteria.” 
A 
CD 
 “Perhaps allow the uploading of support documentation, i.e., cure 
notices, exceptional performance, etc.” 
RD 
 “The categories for the ratings are not always the most appropriate 
for assessing the contractors [sic] performance.  Fro [sic] example, a 
major portion of this contract is performing maintenance on an 
aircraft, however the only way to assess the performance is under 
quality, which does not capture the true nature of the performance.  
There are so many other facets to maintenance such as supplying 
parts on time, recovery of off-site aircraft, etc.” 
CD 
 “I'd like to see the PWS of the contract rated attached in the CPAR 
system.  This is extremely valuable to determine if the contractor 
really has done a similar effort of like magnitude.” 
RD 
 “CPARS ratings need to be accurate. I served on a past 
performance evaluation team and one of my observations was that 
a vast majority of CPARS I reviewed were very over inflated. They 
would indicate "Exceptional" performance, but there was no 
narrative or justification in many cases.” 
A 
 “we are wasting time evaluating every contract when we should be 
focusing on those who fail to perform.  Those who fail to perform 
O 
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should be documented in CPAR.  The contract performance should 
simply be considered acceptable for the contracts with no 
documented performance problems.” 
 “It's a good tool and one of the few effective levers I had on my 
contractor.” 
O 
 “Collecting contractor performance feedback from CORs at the task 
order level is very time comsuming [sic].” 
O 
 “I believe if we want to enhance the process we should 
institutionalize the mid-term (or any) feedback.  I believe our 
Program Manager are only using the CPAR because [sic] it is 
mandated and not as a Program Management tool.” 
F 
 “I have observed many less effective uses and implementation of 
CPARs over my career.  I have experienced situations where 
leadership has asked/directed me to change ratings etc.  Those 
were difficult situations and in the end I did not change my rating.  
Often times, CPARs are to [sic] generic to help in source selection.  
Not everyone puts in the time to write an effective/accurate 
assessment.”   
A 
Key 
Code, description, (frequency count) 
O=other (12) 
A = accuracy (11) 
C = consistency (9) 
CD = criterion/rating definition (7) 
PU = perceived usefulness questioned (6) 
T = training (5) 
J = rating justification (5) 
F = more frequent reporting (3) 
RD = requirements document (3)  
CF = criteria fit (with type of work) (2) 
S = subcontractor PP omitted (2) 
I = incomplete (1) 
TC = transaction costs (1) 
MO = management oversight (1) 
TU = turnover (1) 
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 Appendix E. Dissonance Reasons 
“Some program managers had difference in opinion with assessor.” 
“Debated if "Technical" should be the average of the sub groups (product 
performance, system engineering, etc.) or the lowest of the sub groups.  Also 
debated if requirements were exceeded by "some" or "many" to the Government's 
benefit.” 
“Ratings were given by several different government COR some rated harder then 
[sic] others so that had to be neutralized.” 
“Reviewers tend to be more concerned with how the contractor will react (in the 
case of a negative mark/report) than standing firm with facts to protect the taxpayer 
and ensure fairness in future evaluations.” 
“A misinterpretation on the teams part in relation to color.  They were initially giving 
blue ratings for meeting contract requirements.  This was corrected to green unless 
it was shown that the contractor was meeting the definition of blue performance.” 
“Different interpretations as to what the (negative or positive) impact of actions are 
by the contractor and how this should be assessed in the CPAR.” 
“The rating was higher than the written justification.” 
“Individual members of the team, have different performance expectations and 
interpetations [sic] of the ratings.” 
“Different levels of interaction with the contractor resulted in different points of view 
regarding the performance of the contractor.” 
“Some personnel involved with the review of the CPAR are not actively involved in 
the contract as much.” 
“Although ratings were entered based on performance, reviewers requested 
changes based on assumptions of negative feedback from the contractor, or that 
although performance issues were identified, there was no net impact on cost or 
schedule.” 
“The COR did not provide enough back-up information to justify a rating of 
marginal, therefore it was increased to satisfactory.” 
“Reviewer thought some grades were too lenient without sufficient evidence to 
justify” 
“Disagreement was avoided by not being as critical in the ratings in some areas.” 
“Different points of view on the same issue:  technically acceptable at twice the 
planned cost.” 
“The challenge  was arriving at satisfactory wording to describe the factors during 
the period of evaluation.” 
“people have different perceptions of reality.” 
“Any disagreement was due to the perspective of what position they held and an 
understanding of what was being evaluated.” 
“Management tried to rate the contractor against performance that was not a 
contractual requirement.” 
“Mis-understanding of the CPAR rating system; lack of documented eveidence [sic] 
to challenge rating (e.g. somewhat personal preference/emotional response).” 
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“The CORs and the Contracting Officer sometime view the worked performance by 
the contractor differently.  The Contracting Officer is supposed be objective and 
able to look at both sides to make sure the Government is getting what they paid for 
and to also to insure the contractor is treat [sic] fairly.  The CORs sometimes only 
see if from their perspective.”   
“The PWS was not as defined as some groups would of liked it” 
“The way the performance metrics are laid out, the contractor cannot perform 
exceptionally.  Only poorly or satisfactorily.  This drives my ratings to be 
"satisfactory", where, as the COTR, I think the contractor did better than that in 
some areas.” 
“We had a couple evaluations (Gov't & Contractor) that had different perspectives 
on the work performed.   The Gov't evalutors maked [sic] down the CPAR becuase 
[sic] there was a problem.  The Contractor self identified the problem and wanted 
credit for that self identification and resolution.  There was room for interpretation 
within the rating & contract which caused a disagreement.  The disagreements had 
to be resolved via CPAR assessing official.” 
“Disagreement over Very Good vs Exceptional, as in the benefit to the government” 
“Some people would consider work by this contractor on one of our other contract 
with them.”  
“There were development and sustainment contracts with the same contractor and 
some of the evaluators were conflating the two, separate, contracts.” 
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